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ABSTRACT
There has been much concern in recent years about the rapid increase in
automation on commercial flight decks. Part of the concern is that automation is
introduced without an explicit guiding philosophy about its usability and its
impact on overall flight crew-flight deck performance and aircraft safety. Several
surveys of commercial airline pilots have addressed flight deck automation
issues. However, most have solicited opinions specific to automation
implemented on particular aircraft. This paper describes a survey that was
aimed at gathering pilot opinions about high level, automation philosophy
issues. It was administered to 132 pilots of advanced automation aircraft. The
respondents included 46 Airbus A-320 pilots (representing Northwest, United,
and America West), 47 Boeing 747-400 pilots (representing Northwest and
United), and 39 Douglas MD-11 pilots (representing American and Delta).
The survey was composed of four major sections. The first section asked pilots to
rate different automation components that exist on the latest commercial aircraft
regarding their obtrusiveness and the attention and effort required to use them.
The second section addressed general "automation philosophy" issues, such as:
What attributes make automation "good?" What attributes make it
"trustworthy?" Has increased automation increased or decreased physical and
mental workload? The third section focused on issues related to levels and
amount of automation, such as: On the continuum from unaided pilot
performance to completely automated functions, where should flight deck
systems lie--in different situations and for different functions? What are the
advantages and disadvantages of different levels of automation? The fourth
section addressed several design issues specific to a next-generation high speed
civil transport aircraft.
The results indicate that pilots of advanced aircraft like their automation, use it,
and would welcome more. However, they also believe that automation has
disadvantages, especially fully autonomous automation. They want their
automation to be simple and reliable and to produce predictable results.
Furthermore, in response to questions about the extent to which they felt in
control of the aircraft versus controlling the automation itself, they revealed that
simple and reliable is, in some ways, related to how little attention they need to
pay to it. If there is a necessity to interact with automation extensively, such as
with systems requiring intensive data input or components that must be
constantly monitored, it is more likely to be perceived as obtrusive and pilots'
attention will be focused on the automation instead of the underlying function.
This phenomenon may be an unavoidable penalty for human-centered
automation when contrasted with autonomous systems and highlights the
importance of effective interface design.
VIII
Although we began this survey with the objective of trying to understand the
contrast between human-centered and full automation, we come away from it
with a slightly different perspective. To be against human-centered automation
is to be against apple pie. The issues instead are to understand, from the pilots
point of view, how far they want to go in introducing automation and what
features need to be present to maintain situation awareness, to assure human
control of the integrity of flight and to promote safety and airline cost-
effectiveness. The answer provided in this survey is that the greatest promise for
further gains with the fewest disadvantages is obtained in moving from manual
systems to shared-performance systems, as contrasted with moving from shared-
performance systems to autonomous systems.
Although pilots generally indicated they would like more of all types of
automation, the biggest needs for higher levels of automation were in pre-flight;
communication, systems management, and task management functions;
planning as well as response tasks; and high workload situations. There is an
irony and a challenge in the implications of these findings. On the one hand
pilots would like new automation to be simple and reliable, but they need it to
support the most complex part of the job---managing and planning tasks,
especially in high workload situations.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been much concern in recent years about the rapid increase in
automation on commercial flight decks. The results of pilot surveys have raised
flags over such issues as increased heads down time, degradation of flying skills,
workload extremes, and the requirement to manage unanticipated situations
(e.g., McClumpha, James, Green, & Belyavin, 1991; Sarter & Woods, 1991;
Wiener, 1989). The factors underlying these findings have been explored by
researchers and industry experts (e.g., ATA, 1989; Kantowitz, & Sorkin, 1987;
Norman, 1986; Regal & Braune, 1992; Wiener & Curry, 1980). Part of the concern
is that automation has been introduced without an explicit guiding philosophy
about its usability and its impact on overall flight crew-flight deck performance
and aircraft safety. 'The fundamental concern," according to the Air Transport
Association of America, "is the lack of a scientifically-based philosophy of
automation that describes the circumstances under which tasks are appropriately
allocated to the machine and/or the pilot" (ATA, 1989). To address this need, the
ATA has created a '_/ational Plan to Enhance Aviation Safety through Human
Factors Improvements." In a similar vein, NASA has initiated an Aviation
Safety/Automation Program that has made the development of a flight deck
automation philosophy a high priority (Billings, 1991; Norman & Orlady, 1989).
The challenge in developing an automation philosophy has been well described
by Riley (1989):
In the past, automation decisions could be made by assigning to human or machine
whatever task each was better able to perform. Now, this criterion is often difficult to
apply. Furthermore, designers must consider such issues as the operator's loss of
situation awareness due to relying too heavily on automation, conflicts between the
operator's decisions and the machine's decisions, or tendencies of the operator to
override or defeat the automation due to lack of I_rust in it, p.124.
Of particular relevance to these issues is the growing literature on the cognitive
processes involved in the management of complex multi-task systems (see
Adams, Tenney, and Pew, 1994, for a review). With it, has come an appreciation
of the difficulties faced by the operator:
The distinctive characteristic of the complex semi-automated environment is that the
operator is confronted with a number of tasks at once. No matter: the operator's
behavior must still be goal directed. In order to switch in and out of tasks so as to
maintain the integrity of the system or mission as a whole, the operator must
subordinate each of the individual tasks and the overall ensemble to his or her
understanding of the goals of the system or mission as a whole. Given that the
opportunity, urgency, and particulars of completing any given task must be in
constant flux with the stream of events, this is no small requirement. (Adams,
Tenney, & Pew, 1994, p. 35).
One implication of this research is that automation should be "human-centered"
(Billings, 1991; Rouse, Geddes, & Curry, 1987; Wiener, 1989). At a minimum, it
must provide a coherent task breakdown, maintain focus on higher-level goals,
minimize distractions, and offer strong contextual support following
interruptions (Adams, Tenney, & Pew, 1994).
Another way to interpret this literature, however, is that humans, with their
propensities for error and cognitive limitations, should be taken out of the loop
altogether. Why trust any function to a human when a machine can be
programmed to do it better? These two views, the human-centered and its
opposite, the full-automation view, are two candidate design philosophies that
have been discussed in the human factors literature (Billings, 1991; Norman &
Orlady, 1989; Regal & Braune, 1992; Rouse, Geddes, & Curry, 1987).
To date, there has been little support among researchers for the full-automation
philosophy, for both technical and political reasons (Regal & Braune, 1992). The
human centered-view, by contrast, has many proponents (e.g., Billings, 1991;
Norman & Orlady, 1989; Regal & Braune, 1992; Wilson & Fadden, 1991). It is
founded on the premise that "the flight crew will be an integral component of
safe and efficient commercial flight for the foreseeable future because human
skills, knowledge, and flexibility are required in the operation of complex
systems in an unpredictable and dynamic environment" (Palmer, Rogers, Press,
LatoreUa, & Abbott, 1995). As a consequence, the crew must be kept involved in
and informed about all aspects of the flight situation that they would need to
know about if they were to fly manually and must always have the option to do
so.
Billings (1991) has described the principles of human-centered automation as
follows. The basic premise is: "rhe pilot bears the ultimate responsibility for the
safety of any flight operation" (Billings, 1991). An axiom of this premise is: "The
human operator must be in command." Corollaries to this axiom include:
To command effectively, the human operator must be involved. To be involved, the
human operator must be informed. The human operator must be able to monitor the
automated systems. Automated systems must therefore be predictable. The
automated systems must be able to monitor the human operator. Each element of the
system must have knowledge of the others' intent (Billings, 1991, p. 12).
The goal, in this view, is to create automation that supports human strengths and
compensates for human weaknesses, while leaving ultimate control in the hands
of the human (Billings, 1991; Regal & Braune, 1992). The concept of providing
different levels of automation for flight control--from highly automated control
through a flight management computer, to moderately automated control
through a mode control panel, to basically manual control through a wheel and
column and throttle--was an initial step in this direction. Today, there are many
systems, either on the flight deck or on the drawing board, that would qualify as
human-centered, in the sense of easing information processing, enhancing
situation awareness, and preventing mistakes. Examples include graphic map
displays, integrated caution and warning systems, decision aids, electronic
checklists, and electronic libraries.
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Although the human-centered approach may sound good in theory, in practice
there are many unresolved questions. How much knowledge should a pilot be
expected to have? Are there times and situations where advising the human and
waiting for a decision would be riskier than having the machine take direct
action? Is it conceivable that in the future there will be aspects of flight that are
so well understood that they can be programmed to be completely reliable and
risk-free without the need for human monitoring? These issues are not just
limited to flight decks. They are issues whenever automation is seen as
"simplifying" large complex systems. They point, once again, to the need for
careful guidelines: "A well thought-out philosophy will help designers achieve
the most effective balance between fully automated and human-centered
automation systems" (Regal & Braune, 1992).
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the development of a design
philosophy for new, advanced flight decks by gathering data on pilots' views on
automation philosophy as well as on some of the many concepts and definitions
that will be needed to formulate meaningful guidelines: for example, what it
means for automation to be trustworthy, how to define levels and types of
automation, and how to characterize good and bad automation experiences. This
information was collected by administering a survey concerned with high-level
automation issues to commercial airline pilots.
The Survey
The present survey was administered to captains and first-officers of the Boeing
747-400, Douglas MD-11, and Airbus A-320 aircraft. These aircraft were selected
because, when the survey was administered, they were the newest flight decks of
each manufacturer that had been in service long enough to have a sufficient
number of experienced respondents. The Airbus A-320 went into revenue
service in 1988, the Boeing B747-400 in 1989, and the Douglas MD-11 in 1991. An
advantage of using all three was that they provided the opportunity to compare
responses along a technological dimension. The Airbus A-320 is considered to be
the most highly automated. For example, it is a fly-by-wire aircraft and has
envelope protection features that cannot be overridden. Boeing, is perceived to
be the least automated of the three. For example, its envelope protection system
advises, but does not restrict, the pilot. Douglas, in turn, is considered to lie
somewhere in between the other two. (However, systems management on the
MD-11 is the most automated of all three aircraft.) By including pilots of all three
flight decks in the survey it was possible to look for differences in attitudes and
opinions as a function of different automation implementations on the aircraft
they fly.
Philosophy
The first issue addressed in the survey was the extent to which pilots endorsed
the human-centered, as opposed to the fully automated philosophy. While
researchers may be leaning strongly toward a human-centered philosophy, it
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was not clear to what extent the actual users and designers of the automation
shared their views. Regal & Braune (1992) have warned:
It appears that, at the present lime, many individuals and groups find it easier to work
on developing fully automated systems than dealing with the difficulties involved in
tailoring systems to the cognitive complexities of humans. We need to understand the
advantages and disadvantages of a human-centered automation approach so that it is
possible to objectively choose the optimal system design, p. 3.
A human-centeredness scale, consisting of thirteen questions, was devised by
combing the literature for statements that reflected either a human-centered or
full-automation view and then pairing each statement with an opposing
statement (see Appendix A, Q32-41 and Q46-48 and Table 1). As in previous
surveys the paired statements were presented to subjects as the endpoints of a
scale (McClumpha et al., 1991). Subjects could indicate strong agreement with
either statement by choosing a scale point close to one of the extremities, mild
agreement by choosing a point just on either side of the midpoint of the scale, or
neutrality, by choosing the midpoint itself. Table 1 identifies the endpoints for
each question as human-centered or fully-automated and references the sources
of the ideas for the questions.
Good/Trustworthy Automation
The second issue on which pilot opinions were sought concerned the attributes
that are most essential for making pilots like and trust the automation on their
flight deck. Billings (1991) has proposed a set of desirable attributes for human-
centered automation. As he pointed out, however, it may not be possible to give
equal emphasis to all the attributes. For example, an emphasis on
informativeness, by increasing the complexity of the machine, might be
incompatible with maximal dependability. For that reason, it seemed
worthwhile to solicit pilot opinions on those attributes that should receive top
priority. Therefore, two questions were composed in which subjects were asked
to rank order the ten attributes proposed by Billings and an eleventh one---
-simple"mthat appeared to the investigators to be curiously missing (see
Appendix A, questions 51 and 52). In question 51, subjects ranked the attributes
with respect to goad automation (defined as enhancing safe, economical operation
of the aircraft). In question 52 they ranked them with respect to trustworthy
automation (defined as producing pilot acceptance and faith in its operation or
output).
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Q32-41; 46-48
Quest-
ion No.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
4O
41
46
47
48
Table 1
Human-Centered Philosophy Questions
Opening
Initial emphasis in
training should be
placed on learning about
! would like to see the
introduction of more
automation that
I would like to see the
introduction of more
automation that
it is likely that
situational information
about A/C systems
given by automation in
the future
It is likely that
procedural info.
concerning A/C systems
given by automation in
the future
it is likely that the pilot
in the future will
in the future
Human-Centered
Ending
the "basic airplane" before
introducing the
automation
assiststhe pilot in problem
solving
evaluates and advises the
flight crew on alternative
plans of action
will always require
confirmation
will always require
confirmation
still be responsible for
flying the
aircraft
there will still be system
failures that require
deviations from standard
procedures
Fully- Automated
Ending
the automation before
introducing the basic
airplane
automatically solves
problems
automatically executes
alternative plans of actions
can always be accepted as
fact
can always be accepted as
fact
not be responsible for
flying the
aircraft
we can expect that every
system failure will have a
prescribed procedure to
follow
The biggest obstacle to system design pilot performance
total flight safety is
less emphasisjust as much
emphasis
warn the crew of envelope
exceedence, but not
restrict pilots' control
In pilot training in the
future, principles of
navigation and aviation
are likely to receive
In most cases, an
automatic system should
Decision aids should
emphasize
Decision aids should
)rovide the flight crew
with
situation
information
Decision aids should
provide the flight crew
with
a list of alternatives
recommendations
prevent the aircraft from
exceeding its performance
envelope
response
information
one alternative
commands
Source of
Idea for
Question
Norman & Orlady,
1989, p. 184)
Morgan Herschler,
Wiener, & Salas
(1995)
Morgan, Herschler,
Wiener, & Salas
(1995)
Pew (1988)
Pew (1988)
Billings (1991, p. 12,
57, 80) Jordan (1963,
p. 162)
Regal & Braune
(1992, p.4)
Pew (1988)
Norman & Orlady
(1989)
Billings (1991, p. 29,
86)
Morgan, Herschler,
Wiener, & Salas
(1995)
Morgan, Herschler,
Wiener, & Salas
(1995)
Morgan, Herschler,
Wiener, & Salas
(1995)
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Physical and Mental Workload
The third issue concerned the nature of workload on the advanced flight deck.
Previous surveys have produced somewhat contradictory results. Some studies
have reported workload problems, particularly workload extremes, while others
have not. Wiener (1989), found that automation increased workload at the
busiest times, but this result was not supported by McClumpha et al. (1991). In
order to explore this issue more fully, subjects were asked to rate both physical
and mental workload separately for each phase of the flight (see Appendix A,
question 55).
Levels of Automation: Promise and Concerns
The fourth issue related to levels of automation, that is, the degree to which
functions or tasks are performed by the pilot, the automation, or some
combination. The question was whether pilots could evaluate different levels of
automation on the basis of their costs and benefits (see Appendix A, questions
78-80). While previous surveys have collected pilots' expectations and concerns
about automation in advanced, in contrast to traditional flight decks, they have
not, to our knowledge, been asked to consider the pros and cons of different
levels of automation.
How many, and what kinds of levels, are meaningful to pilots? Again, the goal
was to establish the psychological validity of the concept of a level, while at the
same time collecting data about the trade-offs between costs and benefits
associated with the different levels. The ability of subjects to assign different
expectations and/or concerns to the different levels would provide evidence that
the distinction between levels was real to them. On the other hand, if subjects
gave statistically indistinguishable responses to the three levels, it would be
difficult to argue that the levels were meaningful.
In developing this survey, our original intent was to gather data on all six levels
of automation proposed by Billings (1991). Billings' automation levels not only
distinguished whether the flight crew or automation, or some combination, was
assigned a particular function or task, but also whether the pilot or the
automation had authority over task performance, and if the automation had
authority, how that authority was delegated by the pilot. Closer examination of
these levels, however, revealed that some of the distinctions among levels were
subtle and ambiguous. We were concerned that opinions about advantages and
disadvantages of different levels, or what the ideal level was for different
situations, would be unreliable given the difficulty of understanding the
differences among levels.
Furthermore, as Regal & Braune (1992) have observed, different researchers have
proposed different schemes. The most extensive is from Riley (1989), who has
proposed seven levels along a "machine intelligence" dimension (ranging from
"raw data" to "the anticipation of operator error") and twelve levels along an
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"autonomous" dimension (ranging from varying degrees of communication with
the pilot to varying degrees of taking action with or without pilot permission or
overrides). Thus it is evident that many dimensions (e.g., task performance,
authority, machine intelligence) underlie different notions of automation levels.
Rather than attempting to examine the whole problem of levels, which we
suspect, along with Riley (1989), will be multidimensional and complex, we
opted, as a first step, to see if a meaningful distinction could be made between
one intermediate level of automation, "shared pilot/automation performance,"
and the two extremes: "fully autonomous" and "unassisted pilot performance"
(see questions 78-80 for definitions). In these questions, subjects were presented
with a list of specific concerns and expectations that had appeared in the
literature (ATA, 1989; McClumpha et al., 1991; Norman & Orlady, 1989,
Appendix A; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993; Pew, 1988; Singh, Molloy, &
Parasuraman, 1993; Wiener, 1989) and were asked to indicate how strongly they
felt each one applied to each of the three levels of automation.
Ideal Level of Automation for Different Situation_
The fifth issue addressed in the survey was pilots' satisfaction with the level of
automation available on their aircraft for particular situations (See Appendix A,
questions 56-77). It is common to hear concerns that aircraft are too automated
or that automation has too much authority, yet pilots applaud many of the most
sophisticated automated systems on their aircraft and express the need for more
automated assistance in some situations. We argue that the ideal level of
automation cannot be judged independently of the particular situation or
context. For example, anecdotal reports from pilots suggest that they feel under-
utilized during normal conditions, due to the amount of automation, but could
use more automation in non-normal conditions. The question then becomes,
what aspects or attributes of the situation affect the ideal level of automation
from the pilot's perspective? Recent work on defining situation awareness
requirements (Deutsch, Pew, Rogers, & Tenney, 1994) suggests that it is useful to
decompose complex situations into simple situations that vie for the pilot's
attention and to decompose those situations into a set of attributes. In the
context of commercial aviation, the attributes that appear to be most important
for defining situations are the environmental and system events that occur and
the tasks and functions that can be carried out. In questions 56 to 77, subjects
were asked to consider the following situation attributes: flight condition (i.e.,
normal, non-normal, emergency); phase of flight; mission function (i.e., flight
control, navigation, communication, systems management, and task
management); human information processing task (i.e., monitoring, processing,
responding); and workload (i.e., high, medium, low) (Deutsch et al., 1994; Regal
& Braune, 1992).
For each category of each situation attribute (e.g., for "high workload" in the
workload attribute; for "navigation" in the mission function attribute), subjects
were asked to indicate: a) the level of automation they had available on their
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aircraft for that item; and b) the level they would use ideally. They made each of
these judgments on a five point scale, ranging from "unassisted pilot
performance" to "totally automated performance." By comparing actual vs. ideal
level it was possible to see in what situations differences between current and
ideal levels of automation exist. Equally importantly, subjects' ability to
differentiate between the different categories of a particular situation attribute
would suggest that the particular ways of decomposing situations, and the scales
used, were meaningful. It is important to establish the psychological validity of
these categories because the formulation of automation guidelines is likely to
involve this intermediate level of discourse (e.g., For the cruise phase of flight, or
for low workload situations, the ideal level would be shared performance).
Amgunt 0f Automation
The sixth issue again concerned the question of whether the flight deck is over-
or under-automated. Because this issue is such an important one it seemed
worthwhile to approach it in different ways. This time instead of estimating
ideal levels of automation for different situations, subjects were asked to rate the
ideal amount of automation, where amount was defined as the total number of
automated systems or components on the aircraft.
Subjects answered five questions, concerning five different types of automation.
Each question had two parts. In part 'a' they rated the amount of each type of
automation in their current aircraft. In part 'b' they indicated whether the ideal
amount of automation would be more than, less than, or the same as in their
current aircraft.
The questions differed from those in the previous section in the following ways:
.
2.
The questions concerned amount rather than level of automation.
The questions asked about a different set of categories. This time subjects
were asked to consider five types of automation: aircraft control, systems
control, information automation, decision automation, and protective
automation (see Q81-85 for definitions). These categories were derived from
Billings' (1991) distinction between control, information, and management
automation and were expected to have psychological validity.
. In part 'b' subjects indicated how far they thought they were from the ideal
amount of automation. This time there was no need to subtract the responses
of part 'b' from 'part a' because subjects compared the actual to the ideal
directly in 'b.' (Another reason for not subtracting was that the two scales
were not equivalent.)
Phenomenological Experiences
The sixth and final automation issue concerned the question of how to talk about
the phenomenological experience of using automation. Dimensions of
experience that have been emphasized in the literature and are clearly of
relevance to designers are the notion of workload (e.g., Adams, Tenney, & Pew,
1994; Gopher & Donchin, 1986; Wickens, 1992) and situation awareness (e.g.,
Adams, Tenney, & Pew, 1995; Endsley, 1995; Gilson, Garland, & Koonce, 1994;
Sarter & Woods, 1991; Taylor, 1989; Taylor & Selcon, 1993). There is another
dimension of experience, however, that has been noted persistently in the
literature, but whose ramifications have not yet been explored (Billings, 1991;
Hollnagel, 1991). It has to do with the feeling that one is having a direct as
opposed to an indirect, or mediated experience. An example of a direct
experience would be the feeling, when driving, that one can sense the bumps on
a road directly, rather than through the tires. The same distinction is believed to
occur in aviation. Pilots may feel that they are controlling certain aspects of the
flight directly, even though they are assisted by automation. On the other hand,
they may become so involved with the demands of the automation, that their
attention is completely diverted from the flight. In such cases, pilots may feel
that they are managing or supervising the automation rather than controlling the
flight. This kind of indirect experience is believed to occur when the automation
is new, cognitively demanding, or otherwise obtrusive (HoUnagel, 1991).
In order to explore this dimension, subjects were presented with a list of 31 flight
deck automation systems they were likely to have encountered and were asked
to rate each one on several different dimensions of experience, including
situation awareness, or "knowledge of the big picture," workload, the
controlling/managing dimension, distractibility, predictability, and frequency of
use (see Appendix A, questions 1-31). (Slightly different scales were used for the
alerting questions, 27-31).
The list was compiled based on components described by Billings (1991) and
McGuire et al. (1991). It was then reviewed by two retired airline pilots. They
added and subtracted items based on whether the items made sense in terms of
the scales subjects would use to rate them and whether they were described in
language that would be unambiguous to pilots. Some items, mostly ones that
were either completely transparent or required no pilot interaction, were
eliminated based on preliminary data indicating that they would produce
uniform responses.
Results were analyzed to see if the dimensions clustered into sub-dimensions
and to see which pieces of automation gave rise to which types of experience.
The results of the questions relating to phenomenological experiences will be
described in the results section, but the supporting tables summarizing the data
are provided in Appendix B.
Mi_llaneous
Included in the questionnaire for other purposes were some questions designed
to assess preferences for specific design options. Two questions (see Appendix
A, questions 42,43) related to how autopilot modes are organized. The
functioning of the autoflight systems differs among aircraft types. In terms of a
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philosophy, it hasbeensuggestedthat the autoflight modes should reflect what it
is that pilots really want to control, that is, speed, lateral path and vertical path.
Conventional systems typically are organized by thrust, roll, and pitch, the
aircraft parameters that are directly affected by control inputs. Secondly, given
that autoflight modes have become very complex and are suspected as factors in
several recent accidents, a question about the predictability of mode transitions
was asked. A third question addressed the use of synthetic speech (see
Appendix A, question 44). Synthetic speech is seen as a technology that can
facilitate presentation of information to the flight crew, particularly in high visual
workload conditions, but commercial flight decks have traditionally been very
conservative in regard to introduction of such technologies. A fourth question
related to the overall amount of information available on the flight deck (see
Appendix A, questions 45); the question has continually been raised as to
whether there is too much information on today's flight decks, but to our
knowledge a pilot sample has never been directly asked. Two questions address
decision aids and the presentation of probabilistic information (Q49,50). As
decision aids and artificial intelligence technologies continue to advance, and
automation becomes more capable of probabilistic assessments, the question
arises as to how certain information should be before it is presented to the pilot.
Finally, seven questions (Q88-94) addressed issues related to the ongoing design
of the High Speed Civil Transport (Alter & Regal, 1991; Regal & Alter, 1993;
Swink & Goins, 1992). These included questions concerning the use of displayed
sensor and database data to replace forward vision lost due to the elimination of
forward windows, and questions concerning the best control device, that is, a
side stick, wheel and column, or center stick. The results of these questions will
be presented and discussed in Appendix C. 1
METHOD
Subjects
Captains and First Officers actively flying Boeing B747-400, McDonnell Douglas
MD-11, and Airbus A-320 aircraft for U.S. airlines were recruited for this survey.
A total of 132 pilots, 47 B747-400 pilots, 39 MD-11 pilots, and 46 A-320 pilots,
completed the survey. The sample included one female. The distribution of
Captains and First Officers across airlines and aircraft types is shown in Table 2.
1 Also included, for exploratory purposes, were four open-ended questions (Q 53, 54, 86, 87).
The results will not be discussed in this report.
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Table 2
Number of Captains and First Officers Completing the Survey by Aircraft
Type and Airline
Aircraft Type Airline Seat Number of Pilots
B747-400 Northwest Captains 2
(N--47) First Officers 17
United iCaptains 3
First Officers 25
MD-11 American Captains 11
(N=39) First Officers 2
Delta Captains 13
First Officers 13
A-320 Northwest Captains 5
(N--46) First Officers 2
United Captains 10
First Officers 11
America West Captains 8
First Officers 10
The mean age of pilot subjects was 45.9 with a range of 28 to 59. Subjects
averaged 18.9 years of commercial flying experience, 12704 total flying hours,
and 15.8 years of formal education. All subjects had experience on jet aircraft
other than the one for which they were currently type rated. Classification of
three of the subjects, in terms of aircraft type, was problematic because they were
currently type-rated on both the Airbus A-320 and the Boeing 747-400. In those
cases, subjects were assigned to the aircraft in which they indicated more flying
hours. 2
It is apparent from Table 2 that for unknown, assumably random reasons, there
was an unequal distribution between Captains and First Officers. The proportion
of First Officers in the groups varied as follows: Boeing 89%, Douglas 38%, and
Airbus 50%. Table 3 shows the background characteristics of subjects in the three
aircraft groups. These data were compiled from the biographical forms that each
subject filled out. Unfortunately, due to the unequal representation of Captains
and First Officers across aircraft types, differences emerged in their background
2 One subject in this category was inadvertently misclassified as Boeing instead of Airbus.
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characteristics, complicating the task of comparing the aircraft groups. As can
be seen in the table, Douglas pilots were, on the averagenine or ten years older
than the other pilots and, as a result, had more total flying hours and more hours
flying as pilot in command. The analyses of variance for these characteristics
were all significant: F(2,126)=23.23, p<.0001 for age, F(2,127)=14.93, p<.0001 for
total flying hours, and F(2,125)=10.94, p<.0001 for hours as pilot in command.
Tukey tests revealed that in all cases, the Douglas pilots differed from the other
two groups (p<.05), which did not differ from each other (p>.05).
Table 3
Biographical Data for Pilots of Different Aircraft
Boeing Douglas Airbus
747-400 MD-11 A-320
(N=47) (N=39) (N=46)
Age 42.6 52.3 43.8
Total Hours 11,393 16,154 11,160
Flying
Total Hours as 5,041 9,045 5,688
PUot-in-
Command
Years of Formal 16.3 15.2 15.8
Education
As will be clear from subsequent sections, these problems prevented us from
drawing conclusions about some of the comparisons that we had intended to
make. The aircraft differences we were able to report with confidence met the
following criteria:
1. The results for the different aircraft were in line with expectations.
2. Supplementary analyses, based on an unconfounded subset of the data (e.g.,
only Boeing and Airbus first officers), supported the original analysis.
Materials
A package of materials was sent to each subject. It included a cover letter
explaining the general intent of the survey, a one-page background questionnaire
(see Appendix A), the survey, and an envelope in which to return the survey.
The survey itself consisted of 34 pages, and included four sections with a total of
94 questions (see Appendix A).
Procedure
U.S. commercial airlines were identified that operated the B747-400, MD-11, and
A-320 aircraft. The airlines were called and a contact person (usually the Chief
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Pilot) for each type of aircraft was requested. The Chief Pilots were called and
informed about the study. Chief Pilots contacted Fleet Captains for each aircraft
type, who posted flyers and/or messages where flight crews could read them.
Equal numbers of Captain and First Officer volunteers were requested from each
airline; the goal was to have 150 respondents, 25 Captains and 25 First Officers
for each aircraft type, but as can be seen from Table 2, respondents for some
airline and aircraft types were skewed in terms of number of Captains and First
Officers, and the total number of subjects responding was less than desired.
Volunteers signed up with Fleet Captains and a list of names and addresses was
compiled and forwarded to one of the researchers, who then mailed the materials
package to each subject on the list.
Volunteers were requested to return the survey within a week and were paid
$150 for completing the survey. One hundred sixty surveys were sent out and
132 were returned (Surveys were accepted even if they were late). Subjects were
asked to complete questions pertaining to specific automation components based
on their current aircraft. They were given the name and number of one of the
researchers so that they could call for clarification or explanation of any question
they did not understand. Half a dozen calls were received, all requesting
clarification of the automation pieces listed in questions 1-31.
RESULTS
The results for each of the major issues the questionnaire was designed to
address will be discussed for the sample as a whole. Subsequently effects
attributable to the aircraft currently flown will be explored.
Philosophy
In questions 32-41 and 46-48, subjects responded to thirteen questions designed
to assess agreement with a human centered, as opposed to a fully autonomous
viewpoint. A human-centeredness score was calculated for each subject by
averaging the responses to the thirteen philosophy questions (Q32-41; 46-48).
Before calculating the averages, the polarity of some of the questions was
reversed, and the scores transformed accordingly, so that a five always
represented the human-centered end of the scale. The polarity of the questions
had been varied randomly, to avoid calling the subject's attention to the
dimension of interest.
The average response to the twelve questions, across all 132 subjects, was 3.53.
This score showed that subjects endorsed the human-centered view, but not as
strongly as they could have. An examination of each of the separate philosophy
questions showed that subjects responded on the human-centered side of the
scale consistently for all but one question. (This exception will be discussed
shortly). (See Figures la to lm showing the frequency of responses to each
question at each scale point).
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Question 37 (Figure lf) elicited the strongest human-centered response. Subjects
were nearly unanimous in proclaiming that the pilot will still be responsible for
flying the aircraft in the future (mean =4.9). Not surprisingly, given this view,
subjects also felt strongly on Q32 (Figure la) that beginning pilots should learn
about the "basic airplane," before learning to use the automation (mean=4.05).
They also showed a strong preference for automation that assists the pilot in
problem solving, as compared to one that automatically solves problems (Q33,
Figure lb), another central tenet of human-centered philosophy (mean, with
reversed scale,=3.86).
The only score to fall slightly to the full-automation side of the scale for the
average subject was Q39 (Figure lh). This question asked whether the greatest
obstacle to total flight safety was system design or human performance. The
assumption was that proponents of the human-centered view would focus on the
problem of poorly designed systems while proponents of the full-automation
view would point their finger at human foibles. Interestingly subjects proved to
be more sympathetic to the full-automation view on this question than on any of
the others, responding on the "human performance" half of the scale (mean=2.61,
reversed scale). The respondents may have been influenced by the statistic that
"pilot error" is responsible for two thirds of all aircraft accidents (Regal &
Braune, 1992). Another interesting finding was that on the question concerning
envelope protection (Q41, Figure lj), the B-747 and MD-11 pilots responded on
the human-centered side, while the A-320 pilots responded on the full-
automation side. This result will be discussed in the section on Aircraft
Differences.
These results provide support in the pilot community for the human-centered
design philosophy that has been favored by researchers. In constructing the
scale, effort was made to avoid making one of the poles sound like the "right
answer." The fact that only one of the questions was close to the ceiling (Q, 37),
lends credence to the measurement technique and suggests that the questions
received careful consideration.
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Good/Trustworthy Automation
The average ranking was calculated for each of the eleven attributes for good
automation (Q51) and then for trustworthy automation (Q52). The attribute that
received the most favorable average ranking in each case was then ranked #1, the
next best attribute #2, and so forth. The rank orders obtained in this way are
shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Rank Ordering of Attributes for Good and Trustworthy Automation
Q51-52
Attribute
Dependable
Predictable
Simple
Comprehensible
Info_uLative
Subordinate
Flexible
Error-resistant
Accountable
Adaptable
Error-tolerant
Rank for Good
Automation (Q51)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Rank for Trustworthy
Automation (Q52)
1
2
4
3
5
8
10
7
6
11
9
Note. The ranks indicated are a rank ordering of the average ranks given for the attributes.
As can be seen in the table, the results for the two questions were highly
correlated (Spearman's R=.86, p<.001). Although, Q51 had stressed safety and
economy, while Q52 had emphasized pilot acceptance and use, subjects failed to
make a distinction between "good" and "trustworthy" automation. Striking in
both cases was the clear "back to basics" response. An examination of the first
five ranks showed that pilots want automation that works (i.e., is dependable)
and that they can understand (i.e., is simple, predictable, and comprehensible).
All other features were considered, by their lower ranks, to be secondary. The
message seems to be: Don't try anything fancy (i.e., flexible, adaptable,
accountable, error-tolerant or error-resistant), just give me something I can use.
Billings (1991) has suggested that certain of the attributes on the list oppose
certain others, in the sense that emphasizing one often forces a de-emphasis on
the other. The following attribute pairs, he believes, bear such a relationship:
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• Accountable---Subordinate
• Predictable--Adaptable
• Comprehensible--Flexible
• Dependable--Informative
• Error-resistant--Error-tolerant
The present results suggest the following prioritization for these pairs. With the
exception of the first pair (accountable-subordinate), for which rankings were
inconsistent across Q51 and Q 52, the rankings showed a clear preference for the
left hand members of each pair.
With respect to the problem of human error, the rankings suggest that pilots
want to prevent error from happening in the first place rather than trusting a
machine to correct it. Towards that end, their first desire is for automation that is
easy to use (ranks 1-5), their second is for error-resistant systems that will check
for typical kinds of mistakes (rank 7 or 8) and their last is for automation that will
try to help out after an error has occurred (rank 9 or 11).
In sum, the rankings show a preference for simple, easy to use systems over truly
leading edge technologies. They lend further support to the human-centered
attitudes of the pilots revealed in the philosophy questions.
Physical and Mental Workload
In Question 55, respondents were asked to rate workload for glass cockpits in
comparison with conventional cockpits. Responses were made on a five point
scale where I was "much lower than in conventional cockpits," 3 was "about the
same," and 5 was "much higher." The average physical and mental workload
ratings obtained for each phase of a flight are shown in Figure 2. These averages
are based on 111 out of the 132 subjects. Four subjects had to be eliminated for
failure to respond to all parts of the question. The additional reduction in sample
size was necessary to equalize the numbers from each of the three aircraft groups
so that a mixed-factors analysis of variance could be carried out, with aircraft as a
between-subjects factor (Results of the aircraft analysis will be discussed in a
later section). Subjects were retained in the order in which they had responded
to the survey.
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The results support the conventional wisdom that automation has reduced
physical workload more than it has mental workload. Regarding physical
workload, inspection of the portion of the curve that is below 3.0 ("about the
same as in conventional cockpits") shows that physical workload was rated as
being lower than in the conventional cockpit for all flight phases except two: pre-
flight (4.04), which was substantially higher and taxi (3.14), which was about the
same. The physical aspect of punching buttons into the computer and talking to
ATC in these phases may be responsible for the high physical workload ratings
for these phases. While these actions are not physically exhausting, in the usual
sense of high physical workload, they do entail being physically busy. The
biggest reduction in physical demands can be seen in the cruise phase (1.69),
presumably reflecting the widespread use of flight control and navigation
automation.
Mental workload ratings, showed the same general ups and downs across phases
as physical workload. However, the difference in workload in glass cockpits in
relation to conventional cockpits was more pronounced for physical workload
than for mental workload.
These observations were supported by statistical analysis. A two-way repeated
measures analysis of variance, with workload type (physical vs. mental
workload) and flight phase as within-subject variables revealed a main effect of
workload type, F(1,110)=30.57, p<.0001, a main effect of flight phase
F(6,660)=1215.6, p<.0001, and a significant interaction between workload type
and flight phase (F(6,660)=5.671, p<.0001.
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Individual comparisons were carried out by a Tukey test (significance was
assessed at the .05 level for all Tukey tests in this report). The results revealed
that the rating of mental workload differences between glass and conventional
cockpits were significantly different than the rating for physical workload
differences for the cruise (p<.05) and approach (p<.05) phases and just missed
being significantly different for landing (p<.10).
The Tukey test also showed the following pattern of change over flight phases:
Ratings of both physical and mental workload differences between glass and
conventional cockpits changed significantly from pre-flight to taxi (p<.05) and
from taxi to take-off (p<.05). Physical, but not mental workload differences,
changed from climb to cruise (p<.05), and both types of workload difference
ratings changed from cruise to approach (p<.05).
In summary, the results showed that pilots feel that mental workload has not
been reduced in the automated cockpit to the same extent that physical workload
has. Both physical and mental workload were rated as markedly higher in glass
cockpits than conventional cockpits for pre-flight, and slightly higher for taxi.
Mental workload was rated as slightly higher or the same in glass cockpits for
approach and landing.
L_vel8 of Automation: Promise and Concerns
In questions 78-80, subjects indicated how much they agreed or disagreed with
claims about different levels of automation. First, they rated all the possible
advantages, or promises, of each level (part 'a') and then the possible
disadvantages, or concerns (part 'b').
An overall "promise" and an overall "concerns" measure were obtained for each
of the three levels of automation of interest by averaging the responses to each
item in Q78-80a, and Q78-80b, respectively for each subject. The average
measures, across subjects, are shown in Figures 3a and 3b, respectively. The
number of subjects included in the analysis, after eliminating the few non-
responders and equalizing the aircraft groups, was 114 and 111 out of 132 for
the" promises" and "concerns" analyses, respectively.
The overall promise rating (see Figure 3a) was significantly lower for the pilot
unassisted (2.68) than for the shared or fully autonomous levels, F(2,226)=91.813,
p<.001. The shared and autonomous levels were rated identically overall (both
3.79). An examination of Table 5a shows that pilots felt that the autonomous
level has the most promise to "alleviate fatigue, .... reduce workload," "provide
,,. ,,
more precise data," increase safety, and "increase airline cost effectiveness," but
could not match the shared level for "keep me involved," "keep me informed,"
improve my performance," and "improve my situation awareness." Neither level
could top the unassisted level for "keep me involved."
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Concern ratings showed a clear differentiation of levels (see Figure 3b). Overall
concern grew from 2.3 to 3.29, as automation increased, which was a significant
difference, F (2,220)=96.001, p<.0001. A Tukey test showed that each of the levels
differed significantly from the others. These results were highly stable:
Inspection of individual items (see Table 5b) showed that all but four of the items
increased regularly across levels.
Major concerns at the fully automated level were increased head-down time
(4.05), complacency (3.95), and degradation of pilot skills (3.90). These items,
which have to do with the pilot's ability to "stay in the loop," are related to the
fear that full automation will not "keep me involved" expressed earlier in the
promises section. Fourteen out of the eighteen items on the list received scores
above 3.0, indicating they were of moderate to high concern at the fully
automated level. The four that were of lower than moderate concern were
"temperamental devices," "difficulty in learning to operate," "need for new
skills," and "difficulty in detecting system errors."
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Table 5a
Average Promise Rating at Each Level of Automation
Promise
keep me involved
keep me informed
improve my
performance
improve my
situation
awareness
alleviate fatigue
reduce workload
provide more
precise data
increase _fety
increase airline
cost effectiveness
Pilot Unassisted
4.24
3.18
2.87
2.98
2.03
1.88
2.32
2.25
2.42
Shared Control
4.14
4.21
3.89
3.96
3.47
3.42
3.71
3.82
3.58
Autonomous
3.15
3.99
3.56
3.78
3.65
4.08
4.14
3.90
3.68
Note. The rating scale was: 5 = agree 1= disagree "that automation at this level holds the promise
to..."
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Table 5b
Average Concern Rating at EachLevel of Automation
Q78b-80b
Disadvantage
temperamental devices
display complexity
losing sight of the
raw data
difficulty in learning
to operate
data entry errors
software engineering
eITOl'S
need for new skills
unforeseen and
unintended negative
consequences
workload extremes
(high and low)
increase in the no. of
alerting si_nals
loss of situation
awareness
need to work around
automation in unusual
circumstances
increased head-down
time
difficulty recovering
from automation failure
degradation of pilot skills
difficulty in detecting
system errors
reluctance of crew to
take over from automation
Pilot
Unassisted
1.85
2.15
1.90
2.05
2.33
2.09
2.06
2.83
3.83
2.46
2.94
2.06
2.67
1.94
1.85
3.12
1.78
Shared Control
2.48
2.78
2.77
2.54
3.12
3.11
2.62
2.82
3.10
3.11
2.65
2.94
3.54
2.97
3.11
2.73
2.60
Autonomous
2.76
3.13
3.34
2.95
3.32
3.43
2.78
3.10
3.32
3.40
3.16
3.34
4.05
3.46
3.90
2.71
3.12
complacency 2.30 3.13 3.95
Note. The rating scale was: 5 -- high concern 1 = low concern "that automation at this level could
lead to ..."
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For shared performance, only seven out of the eighteen items were rated higher
on average than "3," indicating more than moderate concern. The items that
dropped from the high concern half of the scale to the low half between fully
autonomous operation and shared performance were: display complexity, losing
sight of raw data, unforeseen and unintended negative consequences, loss of
situation awareness, need to work around the automatics in unusual
circumstances, difficulty in recovering from an automation failure, and
reluctance of crew to take over from automatics.
Although pilots generally had fewer concerns about flying unassisted than about
flying with automation, they did see clear advantages to automation. Two
concerns, workload extremes (3.83) and difficulty in detecting system errors
(3.12), were seen as concerns at the unassisted level that were alleviated by the
introduction of automation.
In summary, subjects showed, through their concerns and promise ratings, that
they have no trouble thinking about three different levels of automation. In
terms of costs and benefits, the intermediate level seemed to be the most
advantageous, because it showed as much promise as the fully automated level
with fewer concerns.
Ideal Level of Automation for Different Situations
In a series of questions subjects were asked to rate the maximum level (Q56-77)
of automation on their current aircraft (see part 'a') and the level that they would
ideally use (see 'b' part ). The questions were asked for five attributes of the
situation that could affect the actual and ideal levels of automation: flight
condition (i.e., normal, non-normal, emergency) (Q56-58); phase of flight (Q59-
66); mission function (i.e., flight control, navigation, communication, systems
management, and task management) (Q67-71); human information processing
task (i.e., monitoring, processing, responding) (Q72-74); and workload (i.e., high,
medium, low) (75-77).
A measure of the subject's satisfaction with the level of automation in his current
aircraft, with respect to the ideal, was calculated by subtracting the ideal rating
from the actual rating for each question. The "actual minus ideal rating" captures
the subject's satisfaction in the following way: A positive rating means that a
higher level of automation is available than pilots ideally would use, a negative
rating means that the highest level available is lower than they ideally would
use, and a zero means that the highest level available is the same as the ideal
level they would use. A negative rating indicates that perhaps higher
automation levels should be considered for that particular situation.
The "actual minus ideal" ratings for each of the five situation attributes are shown
in Figures 4a-4e. For these analyses, the sample was again reduced to 111 out of
132 to achieve equal numbers in the three aircraft groups. A one-way, repeated
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measures analysis of variance, with category as the factor (e.g., high, medium,
and low for the situation attribute labeled "workload,") was carried out on the
"actual minus ideal" scores for each of the situation attributes. The results
showed a significant main effect of category (p<.0003 for human information
processing task, and p<.0001 for all other situation attributes). In other words, the
different perspectives afforded by each of the situation attributes helped subjects
to identify situation categories for which they could use higher levels of
automation in contrast to those for which the available automation level was
sufficient.
The most interesting categories in each analysis were those for which pilots
indicated a level of automation that departed from the ideal. For every bar in
Figures 4a-4e, a t-test for repeated measures was conducted to determine if the
actual level (part 'a') was significantly below or above the ideal ( part 'b'). To
correct for multiple comparisons, the probability level for the t tests in each
classification scheme was multiplied by the number of t tests conducted.
The following categories were found to be significantly above the ideal in the
level of automation available to aid pilots (p<.05, adjusted): normal flight (see
flight conditions, Figure 4a), climb, cruise, descent, and landing (see flight phase,
Figure 4b); flight control (see mission function, Figure 4c). This finding does not
mean that the higher levels of automation should be eliminated for these
situation categories, but it does indicate that lower levels should be available for
pilot use. It also has implications for the likelihood that pilots will resist using
higher levels of automation in some situations, and should be taken into account
in training and operations.
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Q59-66
Flight Phase
Satisfaction with level of automation for different flight
phases. A positive rating means that the automation level
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The following categories were found to be significantly below the ideal in the
level of automation available to aid pilots (p <.05, adjusted): preflight and taxi
(see flight phase, Figure 4b); communication and task management (see mission
function, Figure 4c), responding, defined as performing goal-oriented actions (see
human information processing task Figure 4d); high workload (see work/aad, Figure
4e). This finding, of the need for more automation to deal with pre-flight and
taxi, communication and task management, and high workload situations,
reinforces the message of earlier sections--a plea for attention to the crew's
mental workload.
Amount of Automation
In a series of questions (Q81-85), subjects were asked to rate the amount of
different types of automation on their current aircraft (part 'a') and then to
indicate whether ideally, they would want less, the same amount, or more
automation than they currently have (part 'b'). The average ratings for the two
parts of the questions are shown in Figures 5a and 5b, respectively.
The results of part 'a' (see Figure 5a) showed that subjects felt that their aircraft
had at least a "moderate" amount of automation in all categories. The pilots felt
they had the largest amounts of automation for aircraft control (mean of 4.34)
and systems control (4.18.). Information automation, defined as automation that
informs the pilots about the aircraft and systems states, operations, procedures,
regulations, and location of the aircraft and relevant entities in the environment,
was also considered prevalent (3.94). Pilots felt they had a lower amount of
protective automation (3.52). Decision automation, defined as automation that
aids the pilot in selecting alternatives and making choices, came out lowest (3.11).
An F test for repeated measures indicated that the overall difference between
automation categories was significant, F(4, 440)=59.169, p<.0001. A Tukey test
indicated that each of the ratings for the different automation categories differed
from the others (p<.05), with the exception of one pair, aircraft control and
systems control, which were statistically indistinguishable (p>.05).
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The results for part 'b,' in which pilots indicated the ideal amount of automation
with respect to their current aircraft are shown in Figure 5b. On this scale, a 3.0
indicates a belief that current levels are ideal, a score of more than 3.0 means that
more automation is desired and a score below 3.0 means that less is desired. The
average ratings were all slightly above 3.0, indicating that pilots would prefer,
ideally, to have slightly more automation than they currently have in all
categories. The two categories that came closest to the ideal were aircraft control
(3.3), followed by protection (3.4) automation. Although pilots indicated in part
'a' that they did not have a large amount of protective automation on their
aircraft, they evidently felt that the amount was close to ideal. The biggest needs
were for more information (3.7), decision (3.6), and systems (3.6) automation.
An analysis of variance for repeated measures showed a significant effect of
category, F(4,440)=8.457, p<.0001. A Tukey test confirmed that the need for
information and decision automation was significantly greater (p<.05) than the
need for more control or protective automation. The need for systems
automation was also significantly greater (p<.05) than the need for more control
automation.
Phenomenological Experiences
In questions 1-26 subjects rated different automation systems on seven
dimensions (parts 'a' through 'g'). Questions 27-31 were similar, except that
subjects rated different cockpit alerts on six different dimensions (parts 'a'
through 'f'). Tables B1-B13 in Appendix B show the order in which the
components fell on each of the dimensions, respectively. All 132 subjects were
included in this analysis, but subjects were not required to answer all questions.
They were requested to leave a blank if they were not familiar with the
component. Overall, subjects left 6.8% of the components unrated (data showing
which components were omitted will be presented in a subsequent section
concerned with aircraft differences).
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Ratings were averaged across subjects and automation components for each
dimension queried. Before the averages were calculated, the rating scales for
some of the questions (parts a, c, d, and f of Q1-26) were reversed from the way
they appeared on the questionnaire, so that a '5' always indicated the desirable
end of the dimension.
The average rating across all components and subjects is shown in Table 6 for
each of the dimensions. It is clear from these data that subjects were favorably
inclined towards the automation systems on their flight deck, though they had
some reservations. On questions 1-26, they found the automation components to
be unobtrusive (4.00), predictable (3.97), extremely helpful for reducing workload
(3.82), and they were inclined to use them whenever appropriate (4.39). On the
other hand, they were close to the midpoint when it came to the feeling that they
were controlling the flight rather than managing the automation (3.25, where '5' =
high controlling), and the feeling that they were focusing on the flight rather than
on the automation (3.61, where '5' = attention to flight).
For questions 27-31, subjects clearly trusted the alerts (4.27) and found them
compelling (4.87, see Table 6). They gave lower ratings, however, to the ease of
returning to tasks after an alert (3.50), degree to which the alert can be responded
to without thought (3.52), and immediacy of knowing what the problem is (3.65).
While these responses were on the positive half of the scale, they were close to
the borderline.
To assess whether any of the separate dimensions might have a common basis
from the pilots' perspective, correlations were calculated for each of the
dimensions in Q1-26 and Q27-31, respectively, paired with each of the others.
The two correlation matrices are presented in Tables 7a and 7b.
For Q1-26, all but one correlation were significant (see Table 7a). The three
highest correlations were for: 1) the two dimensions describing the automation
(unobtrusiveness 'c' and predictability 'e', R=.7050, p<.001); 2) the two describing
the pilot (situation awareness 'b' and workload reduction 'f', R=.6698, p<.001);
and 3) the two describing the interaction between pilot and automation (attention
on flight/automation 'a' and feeling of controlling/managing 'd', (R=.6254,
p<.001). These three clusters, while not completely independent, provide a
useful structure for thinking about automation experiences.
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Table 6
Average Rating of Automation Components on Each Dimension
Q1-26and Q27-31
Questions
1a-26a
1b-26b
lc-26c
1d-26d
le-26e
1f-26f
1g-26g
27a-31a
27b-31b
27c-31c
27d-31d
27e-31e
27f-31f
Dimension
attention on flight*/automation
understanding of thebig picture
unobtrusiveness
con trolling*/managing
predictability
workload reduction
frequency of use
attention-getting
trust in alert
knowing what the problem is
ability to respond without thought
ease of returning to task after alert
scarcity of alert occurrences
Average Across
Components
3.61
3.79
4.00
3.25
3.97
3.82
4.39
4.87
4.27
3.65
3.52
3.50
3.65
Note. Rating scales for some dimensions were reversed from the way they appeared in the
questionnaire so that 5 = the favorable end of the continuum for all dimensions. A * is used to
indicate the favorable end where it is not obvious from the dimension name.
1-26a r
1-26b
1-26c r
l-_6dr
1-26e
1-2_
Attention
to Flight
1-26a r
L00
Table 7a
Correlation of the a-g Components for Q1-26 +
Situation
Awareness
1-26b
.2871"*
1.00
Unobtrusive
1-26rc
.4651"*
.3213"*
1.00
m
Feeling of
Controlling
1-26<1r
.6254**
.2093*
.4124"*
1.00
Predictable
1-2Kw
.4388 **
.3637**
.7050"*
.3330**
1_110
Workload
Reduction
1-26_
.2764**
t rathe, **
.4709"*
.1567
.4121 **
1.00
Frequency
of Use
.3229**
.1870"
.53S6"*
.2384"*
.&_qAA**
1.00
+Seven component scores (averaged across Q1-26) were entered for each subject.
rThe 1-5 scale was reversed from the way it appeared in the questionnaire so that '5' would
uniformly represent the favorable pole.
* , , .
Slgmficant at the .05 level. *"Significant at the .01 level.
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Table 7b
Correlation of the a-f Components for Q27-31+
Attention Know Can Respond
Gettin 8 Trust Exactly Automati-
cally
27-31a 27-31b 27-31c 27-31d
27.x31a -'--- 1.1)0 _ _ .1678
..3779
27-31d __-
27-31e
27-31f
+Six component scores (averaged across Q27-31) were entered for each subject.
*Significant at the .05 level.
*"Significant at the .01 level.
Fauty to
Resume
27-31e
.O979
1.00
Frequency
of Alert
27-31f
-.1221
L00
The high correlation found between the two questions intended to explore the
direct/mediated experience (attention on flight/automation; feeling of
controlling/supervising) suggests that this distinction has psychological validity.
Tables B1 and B4 in Appendix B show the components listed in order of the
ratings they received on these dimensions. Components at the top of the list
were rated highest on allowing attention to the flight (or a feeling of controlling
the flight), while those at the bottom were highest on directing attention to the
automation (or a feeling of managing the automation).
An examination of the lists in Tables B1 and B4 in Appendix B substantiates that
the 'a' and 'd' dimensions were highly correlated. In both cases, the types of
automation at the top and bottom differed strikingly from each other. At the top
of both lists, representing the extreme direct experience (attention to flight and
feeling of controlling the flight) are: the hydraulic amplification of inputs, auto
ground spoiler, fly-by-wire controls, and automatic rudder. As would be
expected, the ratings confirm that these controls require little attention and do
not detract from the flying experience. At the bottom, representing the extreme
mediated experience (attention to the automation, feeling of managing the
automation), by contrast, are: FMC-flight planning FMC-auto manage, FMC
LNAV and VNAV, ACARS, and subsystem schematics, as well as the auto
landing. With the exception of auto landing, these components either require
complex pilot input as previous studies have suggested (Sarter & Woods, 1994),
or are complicated enough to distract attention away from the flight.
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The inclusion of auto landing in this group of highly interactive systems rather
than with the other flight control systems at the top of the list is revealing. It
suggests that landing with this system does not free the pilot from doing the job,
at least not mentally. The lack of familiarity with the system and the fact that this
flight phase is extremely critical may be factors contributing to this feeling.
The correlation between situation awareness and workload reduction also is of
interest. Note that the correlation is a positive one: Components listed as
resulting in higher situation awareness generally were rated high in workload
reduction (see Tables B2 and B6 in Appendix B). This finding is very
encouraging since one might expect situation awareness to incur a workload
penalty--that is, it takes effort and attention to develop and maintain situation
awareness. The fact that automation components generally seem to increase
situation awareness without increasing workload is a somewhat unexpected
benefit. There are notable exceptions however. The FMC and TCAS traffic
display were rated as providing high situation awareness, but also were rated as
high in workload (see Tables B2 and B6 in Appendix B). The improved situation
awareness with these components does come with a penalty. The automatic
rudder and hydraulic amplification of inputs were rated low in workload but
also low in situation awareness. These represent the classic case of automating
functions that take the pilot out of the loop which results in their being less
involved and informed than if the function were not automated.
For Questions 27-31, most of the correlations between dimensions were
significant (see Table 7b). However, there was no evidence for any higher-order
dimensions. It is interesting to note the strong negative relationship between
trust and frequency of alert (R---.3316); it is very likely higher frequency means
higher false alarm rates, which obviously reduces trust in the alert. The alerts
that are trusted the least (master caution and warning and TCAS traffic
advisory), are also the ones that require the most thought in responding (see
Appendix B, Tables B9 and Bll).
Aircraft Differences
The effect of flight deck experiences on pilot attitudes and opinions was
examined by comparing survey responses of the pilots in the three aircraft
groups (Boeing 747-400, Douglas MD-11, and Airbus A-320). These flight decks
are thought to vary along a dimension of increasing technology, from Boeing, to
Douglas, to Airbus. Evidence in support of this difference was sought by
examining the number of components in questions 1-26 that subjects were able to
rate. Subjects were instructed to leave a question blank if the aircraft that they
currently fly did not have that automation component. Because the list was
constructed to be a representative inventory of the types of automation systems
found on advanced flight decks, the number of blanks serves as at least a rough
measure of the extent of the automation on the different aircraft. The average
number of blanks was : Boeing 2.8, Douglas 1.4, Airbus 1.1. An analysis of
variance showed a significant effect of aircraft, F(2, 129)=11.258, p<.0001. A
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Tukey test revealed that Boeing had significantly more blanks than either Airbus
or Douglas. However, the latter two did not differ from each other (Tukey
p>.05). Using blanks as a measure, we can at least be confident that Boeing is less
automated than the other two groups.
Philosophy. There were no overall group differences in responses to the
philosophy questions (Q3242; 46-48), F(2,129)<1, p>.05. The average human-
centeredness scores were: Boeing 3.55 Douglas 3.54, Airbus 3.49. However,
examination of individual questions revealed a significant difference on question
41, which concerned attitudes towards envelope protection, F(2,129)=7.728.
p<.0007. A Tukey test indicated that the mean for the Airbus pilots (2.67) was
significantly (p<.05) less human-centered than the mean for either the Boeing
(3.45) or Douglas pilots (3.59), who did not differ from each other (p>.05). On
this question, the Airbus pilots were the only ones to favor an envelope system
that actually prevented envelope exceedence as opposed to just providing an
advisory. This difference is interesting because it reflects the envelope features
available on the respective flight decks.
Good/Trustworthy Automation. There were no obvious group differences in
rankings of the attributes for good and trustworthy automation in questions 51
and 52. The average ranking for each of the attributes was similar across groups.
Physical and Mental Workload. Analysis of the workload ratings in question 55
produced one of the two results (see next section) in which the Douglas pilots
appeared to differ from the others. In this case, there was a significant
interaction between aircraft type and flight phase, F (12, 648)=2.639, p <.002, with
the Douglas pilots reporting a significantly higher overall workload than the
other pilots for two flight phases, approach and landing (Tukey, p<.05). These
results are uninterpretable, however, because of the confounding with
background. They may reflect the conservatism of an older and more
experienced group of pilots, rather than a real aircraft difference.
L_vels of Automation: Promise an_i Concerns. Analysis of the promise ratings
for the three different levels of automation in question 78 showed no aircraft
differences. The concern ratings, however, were similar to the workload ratings
discussed above in showing a higher overall concern from the Douglas pilots
than from the others at every level, F(2, 108)=6.922, p<.002; Tukey<.05). Again,
these results may reflect a conservative bent rather than real aircraft differences.
I_t_al Level of Automation for Different Situations. The analysis of actual versus
ideal levels of automation across different situation attributes, encompassing
questions 56-75 yielded clear and robust group differences. Figures 6a-6e show
the satisfaction measures (actual minus ideal rating) ) for the categories of each of
the situation attributes. It is clear from the figures that in every case in which
there was a negative bar (indicating a maximum available level of automation
that was less than ideal), pilots of the Boeing 747-400 responded more negatively
than did the other two groups. These trends were confirmed by conducting an
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analysis of variance for each situation attribute with aircraft as a between-
subjects variable and category and judgment (actual, ideal) as within-subjects
variables. In all but one case (Q72-74), a significant three-way interaction was
found, confirming that for those categories that were rated as not ideal, Boeing
pilots tended to perceive their available level of automation as being farther
below the ideal than did the others.
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The details of these interactions are:
Q56-58, (see Figure 6a). The closer the situation is to an emergency, the more
pilots, especially Boeing pilots, could use a higher level of automation,
F(4,216)=5.272, p<.0005.
Q59-66, (see Figure 6b). A higher level of automation is desired, especially by
Boeing pilots, at the beginning (pre-flight, taxi) and very end of the flight, (taxi &
park, but not landing), F(14, 756)=2.366, p<.004.
Q67-71 (see Figure 6c). A higher level of automation would be helpful for
communication, system management, and task management, especially for
Boeing pilots, F(8,432)=2.369, p<.02.
Q72-74 (see Figure 6d). This question failed to show a three-way interaction.
However, a significant two-way interaction, between aircraft and judgment
(actual, ideal) confirmed that Boeing pilots rated the maximum available level of
automation further below the ideal than the others for cognitive tasks in general,
F(2,108)=8.913, p<.0003.
Q75-77 (see Figure 6e). The higher the workload, the more pilots, especially in
the Boeing group, feel the need for a higher level of automation F(4,216)=2.621,
p<04.
To be sure that these group differences in satisfaction with automation levels
were not an artifact of certain uncontrolled variables, a reanalysis of the data was
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carried out using a subset of the data. To eliminate the confounding factors of
seat and age, only the data from the Boeing and Airbus First Officers was carried
out (N=23 per group). (A similar analysis for Captains was not possible because
of insufficient numbers in the Boeing sample, see Table 2). The results of the
First Officer analysis supported the results obtained for the larger sample. Three
out of the four three-way interactions that had been significant were still
significant (p<.02); the one that did not reach significance (Q56-58) showed a
trend in the right direction. In addition the two-way interaction in Q72-74
remained significant (p<.002). One possible explanation of the consistently larger
negative gaps in the available minus ideal level of automation ratings for the
Boeing pilots is the lower available level of automation reported by these pilots.
Amount of Automation.. Ratings of the amount of automation in their current
aircraft (Q81-85a) for the three pilot groups are shown in Figure 7a. It is clear
from the figure that the Boeing pilots felt they had lower amounts of automation,
than did the other pilots. This difference was most pronounced for protective
automation, where A-320 pilots reported the most automation and 747-400 pilots
reported the least. The results reinforce the original assumption that the Boeing
747-400 is less automated than the other two aircraft and suggest that the Airbus
A-320 is more automated than the MD-11 at least in the area of protective
automation.
An analysis of variance with aircraft type as a between-subjects variable and
automation type as a within-subjects variable supported these trends by showing
a significant main effect of aircraft group, F(2,108) =11.31, p<.0001, a significant
main effect of automation type, F(4,432)=62.44, p<.0001, and a significant
interaction between aircraft group and automation type, F(8,432)--4.038, p<.0001.
A Tukey test revealed no significant differences between groups for control and
systems automation. For information and decision automation, 747-400 pilot
ratings differed significantly from those of MD-11 pilots (p<.05) and marginally
significantly (p<.10) from those of A-320 pilots. All three aircraft groups differed
significantly from each other in the perceived amount of protective automation
(p<.05).
Ratings of the ideal amount with respect to the current amount (Q81-85b) are
shown in Figure 7b. It is evident from the figure that Boeing pilots expressed a
greater desire for more automation than did the other two groups, especially in
the categories of systems, information, and decision automation.
An analysis of variance confirmed these trends by showing a marginally
significant main effect of aircraft type (F, 2,108)=2.777, p<.10, a significant main
effect of automation type (F4,432)=8.644, p<.0001, and a significant interaction
between aircraft and automation type, F(8, 432)=2.214, p<.03. A Tukey test
revealed only one significant difference between groups: 747-400 pilots' desire
for more information automation was significantly greater than that of MD-11
pilots (p<.05). In addition, a trend toward greater desire on the part of 747-400
pilots was found for systems automation, where the difference between 747-400
38
pilots and MD-11 pilots was marginally significant (p<.10), and for decision
automation, where the difference between 747-400 pilots and A-320 pilots was
marginally significant (p<.10).
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An analysis of variance with data from First Officers only (23 Boeing and 23
Airbus) supported the conclusions about group differences in ratings of the
amount of automation on the current aircraft (part 'a') but not of the desire for a
greater or lesser amount of automation (part 'b'). In part 'a,' the main effects of
aircraft and automation type were significant (p<.0002), as was the interaction
between aircraft and automation type (p<.02). Only the main effect of
automation type was significant (p<.02) in part 'b.'
Phenomenologi'cal Experiences
No group differences were apparent in the ranking of the components in
questions 1-31 on any of the scales.
DISCUSSION
Philosophy
Pilots, as expected, generally endorse human-centered positions about use of
automation. The notable exceptions were the opinion that pilots, and not design,
are the biggest obstacle to flight safety and the opinion among A-320 pilots that
automatic systems (envelope protection) should prevent the aircraft from
exceeding its performance envelope rather than providing alerts and allowing
the pilot to override soft limits. This position among A-320 pilots may be an
indication that pilots' philosophy is influenced to some extent by their training
and aircraftdesign philosophy.
Good/Trustworthy Automation
Pilot rankings of the importance of eleven automation features or attributes were
highly correlated for "good" and for "trustworthy" automation, indicating either
that pilots do not distinguish between good and trustworthy, or that the same
automation attributes are important for both. In both cases, pilots indicated that
they want automation to be dependable, predictable, simple and comprehensible.
It is less important for it to be flexible, error-resistant, accountable, adaptable,
and error-tolerant. The message from pilots to designers seems to be: Don't try
to be fancy, just make sure it I can use it and it works.
Physical & Mental Workload
Pilots' ratings of differences in mental and physical workload between glass and
conventional cockpits were phase dependent, with higher relative workloads in
glass cockpits at either end of the flight than in the middle. Workload was rated
as being much higher than it had been in conventional cockpits during preflight
and similar to how it used to be for taxi and approach. Reductions in workload
with glass cockpits were found for take-off, climb, cruise and landing, where
ratings were lower than for conventional cockpits (rating < 3.0). These results
suggest that efforts to reduce workload during pre-flight, when activities such as
system initialization and data entry must be performed, and during taxi,
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approach, and landing, where the mental workload is as high or higher in glass
cockpits as in conventional cockpits, might be beneficial.
.Levels of Automation: Promise and Concern_
Pilots believe that fully autonomous and shared pilot/automation performance
dearly have greater benefit than unassisted performance. The fully autonomous
level has more benefit than the shared performance level for workload reduction,
providing more precise data, and increased airline cost effectiveness, while the
shared level has more benefit than the fully autonomous for keeping pilots
involved and informed, and improving their performance and situation
awareness. However, both automation levels have greater disadvantages or
concerns than unassisted performance. Pilots had greater concerns with the fully
autonomous level than with the shared performance level. This suggests overall
that the shared performance level, which is advocated by the human-centered
approach, holds the most promise without the accompanying concerns.
Ideal Level of Automation for Different Situations
As expected, pilots' perception of current and ideal levels of automation depend
on important aspects or attributes of the situation in which it is used. There were
several situation categories for which pilots would ideally use a higher level of
automation than was available on their current aircraft. These situations
included: Pre-flight and taxi phases of flight; communication, systems
management and task management functions; information processing tasks
concerned with planning and responding; and high workload conditions. The
design implication is for higher levels of automation in these areas. There were
other situations where pilots would use a lower level of automation than is
available. These situations included: normal flight; climb, cruise, descent and
landing phases of flight; and flight control functions. The design implication is
that in certain cases lower levels of automation should be available and
operationally sanctioned even if higher levels exist. It should be noted that
current aircraft do make lower levels of automation available for these situations.
Amount of Automation
Pilots generally want more of each of the five types of automation that were
described. MD-11 and A-320 pilots described their aircraft as having more
automation in each category than did the B747-400 pilots. The only difference
between the MD-11 and A-320 groups was that A-320 pilots rated their aircraft as
higher in amount of protective automation. A-320 and MD-11 pilots felt that the
ideal amount of automation was closer to what they had than did B747-400 pilots
(although, caution must be taken in interpretation of the analyses of aircraft
differences because of the previously described biases in the demographics of thegroups).
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Phenomenological Experiences
Automation components on current aircraft vary widely on the various
dimensions that were explored in terms of obtrusiveness, workload, situation
awareness, predictability, and sense of attending to and performing an
underlying function versus managing the automation. As expected, components
requiring significant input or monitoring, such as the flight management
computer and ACARS are more obtrusive, workload intensive, and result in the
sense of managing the automation, than fairly autonomous systems such as
automatic ground spoilers and automatic rudders. Interestingly, the autoland
system looks more similar in profile to the flight management computer than to
the automatic rudder. The results of these questions indicate that many
automated systems provide increased situation awareness without a workload
penalty. The penalty in obtrusiveness, workload, and the sense of managing the
automation that occurs for some components requiring significant pilot-
component interaction highlights the importance of making pilot interfaces to
these devices as intuitive and simple as possible.
Aircraft Difference_
There was much evidence that the A-320, MD-11 and B747-400 differ in the level
and amount of automation they possess. Generally, pilots indicate they are
satisfied with existing automation, and welcome more, particularly for those
situations in which they are not provided with much automated assistance
currently. There is definitely no indication that there is an "over-automation"
problem with any of the three aircraft types, though generally pilots' philosophy
seems to indicate they would be more comfortable with a shared pilot-
automation performance level than a fully autonomous level of automation.
Pilots' philosophy seemed generally consistent across groups of pilots flying
different aircraft types, with the notable exception that A-320 pilots prefer hard
limits for envelope protection and MD-11 and B747-400 pilots prefer soft limits.
CONCLUSION
The pilots we have surveyed have presented an interesting portrait of the value
of existing automation and the directions that they wish to see flight deck design
take in the next generation of aircraft. They are appreciative of the automation in
current generation glass cockpits and claim to use it whenever it is appropriate.
They want their automation to be simple and reliable and to produce predictable
results. Not only are these features of automation equated with trustworthy
automation, but when the trade-offs are between flexible and adaptable vs.
simple and reliable, they still opt for simplicity. Furthermore, in response to
questions about the extent to which they felt in control of the aircraft vs.
controlling the automation itself, they revealed that simple and reliable is, in
some ways, related to how little attention they need to pay to it. The results also
identify the kinds of systems in use today that provide this kind of reliability.
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Although we began this survey with the objective of trying to understand the
contrast between human-centered and full automation, we come away from it
with a slightly different perspective. To be against human-centered automation
is to be against apple pie. The issues instead are to understand, from the pilots'
point of view, how far they want to go in introducing automation and what
features need to be present to maintain situation awareness, to assure human
control of the integrity of flight and to promote safety and airline cost-
effectiveness. The answer provided in these surveys is that the greatest promise
for further gains is obtained in moving from manual systems to shared systems,
as contrasted with moving from shared control to autonomous control.
Situation awareness, in the pilots' opinions, is supported by the variety of
sophisticated navigation, planning and system status displays that are in use
today and they report that these are among the most frequently used aspects of
automation. The majority of pilots surveyed felt that the biggest needs for
additional automation were to further alleviate the mental workload demands
imposed on them in time-constrained decision making situations. Although
there were differences of opinion among the pilot populations that had
experience in different aircraft, the similarities were much greater than the
differences. In the aggregate they indicated the desire for more, and higher
levels of, automation. When automation level desires were sorted by situation
aspects such as flight phase, and mission function, those aspects which posed the
greatest mental workload demands were the ones that were highlighted forhigher levels of automation.
There is an irony and a challenge in the implications of these two views. On the
one hand they would like new automation to be simple and reliable, but they
need it to support the most complex part of the job--the cognitively demanding
or busy situations.
Finally, a word should be said about the value of this survey from a theoretical
point of view. In addition to clarifying pilot preferences for future design efforts,
the survey gave a boost to efforts by researchers to develop a scientific basis for a
design philosophy. The survey results should increase confidence that the basic
concepts and distinctions, or the building blocks that will be needed, are starting
to be put into place. For example, user support for the notion of a human-
centered philosophy (Billings, 1991; Norman & Orlady, 1989; Rouse, Geddes, &
Curry, I987; Wiener, 1989) was confirmed by the results of the study. Pilots
endorsed the philosophy in the sense that they indicated their belief in the need
for the pilot to remain in charge, the impossibility of foreseeing all procedural
requirements, and the desirability of automation that advises rather than
commands.
The notion of different levels of automation (Billings, 1991; Regal & Braune,
1992), while just touched upon in the present survey and in need of further
refinement, nevertheless was supported by the clear differentiation of
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advantages and disadvantages for the levels examined. The next step would be
to explore in a similar way a more sophisticated multidimensional scheme for
describing levels of automation. Riley's (1989) characterization of different levels
in terms of degree of machine intelligence and authority would be a good
candidate.
Related to the notion of levels is the idea that the ideal level of automation will
depend on the situation, defined in terms of its normalcy or non-normalcy, the
flight phase, the functions that need to be carried out, the specific tasks that need
to be accomplished and the cognitive resources required (Deutsch, Pew, Rogers,
& Tenney, 1994). The results of pilot assessment of ideal levels under variations
of these circumstances supported this taxonomy of situations and situation
requirements. The next step would be to examine combinations of these
attributes, for example, the ideal level of automation for decision making under
emergency conditions in the landing phase.
The idea of creating a taxonomy of automation experiences was supported by
the results of the component ratings. The scheme that emerged from the data
was the following. Pilots seem to categorize their experiences along three
dimensions. The first is the way in which they perceive the automation itself
(e.g., predictable, unobtrusive)..The second is the way in which the automation
modifies their task (e.g., improved situation awareness, lower workload). The
third is how they perceive the task (e.g., controlling vs. managing, attending to
flight vs. automation). The latter category of interaction variables is a concept
that has been discussed often in the literature (Holinagel, 1991; Wiener, 1989), but
now has a stronger empirical basis.
In short, ideas that were culled from hours of immersion in the literature, honed
by the rigors of questionnaire production, digested by pilots, and subjected to the
vagaries of statistical analysis, proved to be remarkably robust.
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APPENDIX A
Pilot Background Questionnaire
Automation Survey
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Pilot Background Questionnaire
1. General Information
Full Name:
Address:
Fwst. Middle, L,st
Street mad Number. ct P.O. Box
City. SUae. Zip Code. _1 Country (if not USA)
Home Phone: (. .)
Area Code Number
Age
Work Phone: C----)
Area Code Number
2. Current Position
Airline:
Seat:
Capla_ First Of Iicer, Engine, etc.
Airplane(s): 1.
2.
No. of years
No. of years
No. of years
No. of years
3. Past Experience
Years Flying Commercial (approximate):
Years Flying Military (approximate):
Total Hours Flying (approximate):
Total Hours Flying as Pilot-in-Command (approximate):
Years of formal education: (e.g. high school graduate = 12)
Please list the aircraft on which you have experience, beginning with that currently flown. Check
the appropriate boxes under hours in type and simulator hours to indicate the number of hours in
each. Check the I/CA column if you are/were an instructor (I) or check airman (CA) on an
aircrat_. Check the last column for any aircrat_ for which you are currently type rated.
Aircraft Type Hours in Type Simulator Hours I/CA Currently
_:_,__.r_'_'_i/_: < 300 300-I000 > 1000'): :_" " :2'"_',:':!__'_'.:i'.-'li 0 < 50 > 50 Type Rated?
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Survey of Pilots of Advanced Automation Aircraft on Philosophy
Issues Related to Design and Use of Flight Deck Automation
NASA Langley Research Center
Section 1
This section deals with your experiences with particular automation components. In answering these
questions, please answer winumly for the aircraft you currently fly. If your aircraft does not have a particular
automation component, then leave the question blank. Most of the labeling of automation components is based on
Boeing terminology. If you call the component by another name, please write that label on the questionnaire. If you
are not sure what component we are trying to identify, please contact one of the researchers at the numbers provided
on the cover sheet.
lqe,ms¢ rio e,w._hof the aulommion components on the scales indicated. The lahels at the cads of each scale
describe the end points of the scale. The midpoint (3) _nts a neuu_l rating. For example, for the f'ust item, if
your attenlioa in flying an aircraft with automatic braking were equally focused on the flight and on the automation,
you would circle 3. If your attention were slightly more focused on the automation than it was on the flight, you
would circle 4. When completing statements (b) and (f), which ask for relative information (e.g., higher or lower,
shallower or deeper), please answer in relation to the case in which you do not have or use that automation
component.
1. When I use automatic braking:
(a) My attention is focused on the
Co) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight 1 2 3 4 5 automation
shallower 1 2 3 4 5 deep_
unobtrusive 1 2 3 4 5 distracting
controlling 1 2 3 4 5 managing the
the aircraft automation
difficulty 1 2 3 4 5 ease
lower 1 2 3 4 5 higher
never 1 2 3 4 5 always
5O
2. When I use the automatic engine start:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automation with
(0 My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
engine
shallower
unolmusive
controlling
the engine
difficulty
lower
never
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 distracting
1 2 3 4 5 managing the
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
3. When I use hydraulic amplification of control inputs:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I cau predict the behavior of the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
4. When I use a flight director:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unolmusive
controlling
the au'craft
difficulty
lower
never
flight
shallower
unobu_sive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
lower
never
1 2 3 4 5 automal/on
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 disli'acting
1 2 3 4 5 managing the
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 dism_ting
1 2 3 4 5 managing the
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
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5. When I use stability augmentation systems:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
flight
(c) The automation is
(d) I feed as though I am
(e) i cau pred_t the behavior of the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is _, I use it
6. When I use a primary flight display:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can wedict the behavior of the
automation with
shalJower
unobin_sive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
lower
never
flight
shallower
unoblrusive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
(f) My overall workload is lower
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use never
of this component is apwowiate, I use it
7. When I use the autopilot to control HDG, SPD, or ALT:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automation with
flight
shallower
unoMrusive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
(f) My overall workload is lower
never(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
I 2 3 4 5 distra_in8
I 2 3 4 5 managing the
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 distngting
1 2 3 4 5 managing the
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 dislr_ting
1 2 3 4 5 mauagingthe
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
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$. When I use the autopilot for pitch, roll, and yaw control:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automation with
(0 My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unolmusive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
lower
never
9. When I use the autopilot to control vertical or horizontal
navigation paths:
flight
shallower
unobuusive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automation with
(0 My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
I 2 34 5 automation
1234 5 deet_
1234 5 distracting
1234 5 managinglhe
automation
1234 5ease
1234 5 higher
1 234 5 always
1234 5 au_tim
12345dee_
1234 5 distrac_
1234 5 managmg_
automation
12345_
1234 5 higher
l 234 5 always
10. When I use the autothrottle:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
aulomation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
lower
never
1234 5 au_tim
1234 5 deeper
1234 5 dismtc_
1234 5 managing_
au_tim
12345_
12345bi_
1234 5 always
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11. When I use automatic landing:
(a) My attention is focused on the
Co) My tmderslmgling of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as thongh I am
(e) I c_n wed_t the behaviof °f the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is lower
(g) In the flight phase of mode where use never
of this component is appmwiate, I use it
12. When I use speed envelope limiting:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) i can pred_t the behavior of the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is lower
(g) In the flight phase of mode where use never
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
_ive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
controlling
the mrcraft
difficulty
13. When I use fly-by.wire engine and/or flight controls:
(a) My attention is focused on the
Co) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
controlling
the aircraft
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
auu3mation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase of mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
difficulty
lower
never
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 distracting
1 2 3 4 5 mana_ngthe
automation
I 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 disncting
1 2 3 4 5 managing the
automation
1 234Seine
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
1 2 3 4 5 automation
! 2 3 4 5 cksq_
1 2 3 4 5 distr_ting
I 2 3 4 5 managing the
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
I 2 3 4 5 always
54
14. When I use flap limiting (e.g., auto retraction feature):
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(c) I can pred/ct the behavior of the
automation with
(0 My overall workload is
(8) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
lower
never
1 2 3 4 5 au_fim
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 disu'aclin8
1 2 3 4 5 mauaging_
autonmfion
12345_
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
15. When I use an auto ground spoiler:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as thongh I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is
(8) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
lower
never
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 34 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 distracting
1 2 3 4 5 mauagingthe
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
16. When I use automatic compensation for asymmetrical thrust (e.g., automatic rudder):
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automation with
(0 My overall workload is
(8) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
controlling
the aircraft
difficulty
1 2 3 4 5 _tion
1 2 3 4 5 deel_
1 2 3 4 5 diswac_
1 2 3 4 5 m mmgmg_
_lomation
12345_
lower
never
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
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17. When I use the FMC for automated flight planning (e.g., planning of route, waypoints,
etc.):
(a) My attention is focused on ;he
Co) My underslanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can pa_di_ the hehavior of the
automation with
(0 My overall woddoad is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
navigating
difficulty
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 distracting
1 2 3 4 5 managing the
automation
1 2 3 4 5ea_
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
lg. When I use the FMC for automated performance management:
(a)My attentionisfocusedon the
(b)My undexstandingofthebigpictureis
(c)The automationis
(d)IfeelasthoughIam
(e) I can predictthebehavior of the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g)Intheflightphaseormode whereuse
ofthiscomponentisappropriate,Iuseit
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
navigating
difficulty
1 2 3 4 5 automation
I 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 distracting
I 2 3 4 5 managingthe
automation
I 2 3 4 5ease
lower
never
1 2 3 4 5 higher
I 2 3 4 5 always
19. When I use the FMC for automated flight guidance (e.g., LNAV, VNAV):
(a) My attention is focused on the
Co) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I cau wedict the behavior of the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
navigating
difficulty
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
I 2 3 4 5_
1 2 3 4 5 managing the
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
[ower
never
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
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20. When I ux a TCAS traffic display:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automat/on with
(f) My overall woAload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
21. When I use the navigation display:
(a) My attention is focused on file
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) Tic automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can Predict the behavior of the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
navigating
difficulty
lower
never
flight
shallower
unobu_sive
navigating
difficulty
lower
never
1 2 3 4 5 _tonmfion
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 distracling
I 2 3 4 5 managing_
auction
12345_
1 2 3 4 5 highex
1 2 3 4 5 always
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 distracting
1 2 3 4 5 managing the
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
22. When I use the inertial reference system:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big pictm'e is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automation with
(0 My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unobtrusive
navigating
difficulty
lower
never
I 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 disuacfing
1 2 3 4 5 mauagingthe
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
57
23. When I use auto radio tuning:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I cau wedict the behavior °f the
autonmfion with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase _ mode whereuse
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
mmbc_ive
commum'cating
difficulty
1 2 3 4 5 autommion
I 2 3 4 5 deeper
I 2 3 4 5 disuacting
1 2 3 4 5 managingthe
automation
1 2 3 4 5csse
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
24. When I use ACARS:
(a) My attention is focused on the
Co) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as thou8hlam
(e) IcanIxedictthebehavi°r°fthe
automation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
25. When I use sub-systems schematics:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the behavior of the
automation with
(f) My overall workload is
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use
of this component is appropriate, I use it
flight
shallower
unobuusive
communicating
difficulty
night
shallower
unobtrusive
managing
the sub-systems
difficulty
lower
never
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deel_
1 2 3 4 5 disuactin8
1 2 3 4 5 nmnagingthe
autmnafion
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
1 2 3 4 5 automation
1 2 3 4 5 deeper
1 2 3 4 5 distracting
1 2 3 4 5 mauagingthe
automation
1 2 3 4 5ease
1 2 3 4 5 higher
1 2 3 4 5 always
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26.
When I use envelope protection with active flight control intervention:
(a) My attention is focused on the
(b) My understanding of the big picture is
(c) The automation is
(d) I feel as though I am
(e) I can predict the hehavior of the
automation with
flight 1 2 3 4 5 automation
shallower ! 2 3 4 5 deqmr
unobtrusive 1 2 3 4 5 distracting
controlling 1 2 3 4 5 managing the
the aircraft automation
difficulty 1 2 3 4 5 ease
(0 My overall workload is lower
(g) In the flight phase or mode where use never
of this component is appropriate, I use it
1 2
1 2
34 5 higher
3 4 5 always
Please complete the following statements concerning alerting systems.
27. When a master caution and warning alert occurs:
(a) The alert gets my attention eventually
(b) I trust that lhe alert signals a real event never
(c) I know exactly what the problem is eventually
(d) My response to the alert requires thought
(e) Returning to interrupted tasks after difficult
the alert is
(0 On my current aircraft, these alerts never
occur
1234 5 immediately
123 4 5 always
123 4 5 immediately
12 3 4 5 is automatic
12345easy
123 4 5 very often
8. When the GPWS warning occurs:
(a) The alert gets my attention
(b) I trust that the alert signals a real event
(c) I know exacdy what the problem is
(d) My response to the alert
(e) Returning to interrupted tasks after
the alert is
(0 On my current aircraft, these alerts
OCCur
eventually
never
eventually
requires thought
difficult
never
123 4 5 immediately
123 4 5 always
1234 5 immediately
12 34 5 is automatic
1234 5easy
123 4 5 very often
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29. When a configuration warning occurs:
(a) The alert gets my attention
(b) I trust that the alert signals a re_ event
(c) I know exactly what the problem is
(d) My response to the alert
(e) Returning to interrupted tasks af_
the alert is
(f) On my current aircraft, these alerts never
occur
30. When a TCAS traffic advisory occurs:
(a) The alert gets my attention
(b) I trust that the alert signab a real event
(c) I know exactly what the problem is
(d) My response to the alert
(e) Returning to interrupted tasks after
the alert is
(f) On my current aircraft, these alerts never
occur
31. When a TCAS resolution advisory occurs:
eventually
licvef
eventually
requires thought
difficult
eventually
ncver
eventually
requires thought
difficult
(a) The alert gets my attention eventually
(b) I trust that the alert signals a real event never
(c) I know exacdy what the woblem is eventually
(d) My response to the alert requires thought
(e) Returning to interrupted tasks after difficult
the alert is
(f) On my current aircraft, these alerts never
occur
1 2 3 4 5 immediately
1 2 3 4 5 always
1 2 3 4 5 immediately
1 2 3 4 5 is automatic
1 2 34 5 easy
1 2 3 4 5 very often
1 2 3 4 5 immediately
1 2 3 4 5 always
1 2 3 4 5 immediately
1 2 3 4 5 is automatic
1 2 34 5 easy
1 2 3 4 5 very often
1 2 3 4 5 immediately
1 2 3 4 5 always
1 2 3 4 5 immediately
1 2 3 4 5 is automatic
1 234 5easy
1 2 3 4 5 very often
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Section 2
This section addresses general automation philosophy issues, including training, pilot and automation roles
and tasks, decision aids, and automation as it relates to pilot workload, pilot trust, and aircraft safety.
Pleasecompleteeach statementby circlingthenumber on thescalethatrepresentsthedegreetowhich one
or the other phrase is consistent with your opinions and beliefs. For example, for the In'st statement, if you
believe strongly lhat initial emphasis should be placed on learning the basic airplane before introducing the
automation, you would circle "5;" if yon believe that the automation should be int_xluced lust, but only
have a slight pcefev_nce for this position, you would circle "2."
32. Initial emphasis in training should be placed on learning about:
lhe amomati_ before the "basic airplane" before
introducing the introducing the
"basic airplane" automation
I 2 3 4 5
33. I would like to see the introduction of more automation that:
assists the pilot in
problem solving
automatically solves
problems
I 2 3 4 5
34. I would like to see the introduction of more automation that:
35.
6.
evaluates and advises the
flight crew on alterna-
tive plans of action
automatically executes
alternative plans of
action
1 2 3 4 5
It is likely that situational information about AJC systems given by automation
in the future:
willalways require
confmnation
can always be accepted
as fact
1 2 3 4 5
It is likely that procedural information, response recommendations and commands
concerning A/C systems given by automation in the future:
will always require
confirmation
can always be accepted
as fact
1 2 3 4 5
37. It is likely that the pilot in the future will:
not be responsible for
flying the aircraft
still be responsible for
flying the aircraft
I 2 3 4 5
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M. In the future:
there will still be system
failures that require devi-
ations from standard
;rocedores
we can expect that every
system failure will have
ap  bed 
to follow
1 2 3 4 5
39. The biggest obstacle to total flight safety is:
40.
system design pilot performance
1 2 3 4 5
In pilot training in the future, principles of navigation and aviation are likely to
receive:
less emphasis just as much emphasis
I 2 3 4 5
41. In most cases, an automatic system should:
prevent the aircraft from
exceeding its perfonn-
alw, e envek_)e
warn the crew of envelope
exceedence, but not restrict
pilots' control
1 2 3 4 5
42. Autoflight mode annunciation should be organized and displayed by:
43.
what is controlling(auto-
throttle, roll, pitch)
what is being controlled (speed,
lateral path, yen. path)
1 2 3 4 5
On my current aircraft, automatic transitions between different autoflight modes
are usually:
hard to predict easy to predict
1 2 3 4 5
44. I think synthetic speech for providing information to the pilot should be:
used only for tlme-critical
warnings (e.g., "pull-up,"
windshear')
used to convey a variety of messages
(e.g., ATe datalink, FMC,
ACARS, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5
45. I think the overall amount of information available on my aircraft is:
not enough too much
1 2 3 4 5
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The following questions conce_ decision aids--automation that provides inform_ion, advice, and
recommendations about possible al_natives. Examples of decision aids would be systems that help
diagnosea systemsfault,selectan alternateairportordeterminetheoptimalcostindexforthecurrentflight
conditions.
46. Decision aids should emphasize:
situation response
information information
I 2 3 4 5
47. Decision aids should provide the flight crew with:
one a list of
alternative alternatives
I 2 3 4 5
48. Decision aids should provide the flight crew with:
49.
0.
recommendations commands
I 2 3 4 5
Sometimes decision aids weigh evidence and make a probabilistic assessment
(e.ll., a physician's diagnostic aid might determine that your headache, fever, and
|eneral malaise has an g0% chance of being due to the flu). A decision aid
should only provide information to the pilot if it is certain that it is 100%
correct.
disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5
If a decision aid tells me the probability of the choice being correct, I will accept
information that has as low as a % probability of being correct.
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51. Automation can be considered good if it enhances safe, economical operation of
the aircraft. There are many attributes of automation which designers believe
make it good. Please rank the importance of the 11 attributes listed below for
good automation. For example, if accountable were the most important quality
for good automation, you would put a 1 in the space next to it, and if adaptable
were tin least important quality for good automation, you would put an 11 in the
space next to it, and so on.
Attribute Rank
Accountable means the automation informs the
pilot of its actions and is able to explain them.
Adotab/¢ means that displays, control devices, etc.,
are re-Wogmmmable within a wide range of pilot
p_ermces and need_
Comprokemsibl¢ means that one can figure out
what the automation is doing and what needs
to be done to opexate it
Dt_m_tb/¢ means that the automation does what
it is supposed to do and nevex does what it is not
 ppo n to do.
Error.resistant means that the automation keeps
pilots from c_mmitting exrovs(e.g., disallowing
inputs when automation can detect entry is wrong).
Error4o/traMt means that the automation can
detect and reduce the effects of error, given that
some errors will inevitably occur.
F/ex/b_ means that an appropriate range of modes
and levels are available to the operator (e.g., from
manual c.ont_rolto autonomous operation).
l_form_lv¢ means that the automation imparts
knowledge to the pilot (e.g., information about the
airplane, automation, problems, operations, etc.)
Predictable means that the automation behaves
as expected (i.e., it is clear what it is going to do ).
Shapie means that it is easy to understand and use
(i.e., it is straightforward to learn and operate iO.
Ssubord/Mt¢ means the automation never assumes
command, except in we-defined situations. When
it does assume command, it can be countermanded.
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52. Automation can be consideredtrustworthy if pilots accept it, use it, and have faith
in its operation or output. There are many automation attributes which may help
it be trustworthy. Please rank the importance of the 11 attributes listed below
for trustworthy automation. For example, if accouutabl¢ were the most
important quality for trustworthy automation, you would put a 1 in the space
next to it, and if adaptable were the least important quality for trustworthy
automation, you would put an 11 in the space next to it, and so on.
Attribute Rank
Aceoumtable means rite automation informs the
pilot of its actions and is able to explain them.
Adapta_ means that displays, control devices, etc.,
are re-programmable within a wide range of pilot
l_eae_,_s and needs.
Comprehensible means that one can figure out
what the automation is doing and what needs
to be done to operate it.
Depttsda/t/t means that the automation does what
it is supposed to do and never does what it is not
supposedto
Error-resLgtaat means that the automation keeps
pilots from committing errors (e.g., disallowing
inputs when automation can detect entry is wrong).
Error-toltrant means that the automation can
detect and reduce the effects of em_, given that
some enm_ will inevitably occur.
F/e_ means that an appropriate range of modes
and leveL5ate available to the operator (e.g., from
manual control to autonomous operation).
lnformatD¢ means that the automation imparts
knowledge to the pilot (e.g., information about the
airplane, automation, problems, operations, etc.)
Predictable means that the automation behaves
as expected (i.e., it is clear what it is going to do ).
S/mp/e means easy to understand and use (i.e., it
is suaightfcrward to learn and operate it).
Su_rdimate means the automation never assumes
command, except in pre-defined situations. When
it does assume command, it can be c_unt_nnand_.
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53. In tbe spaceprovided,pleasedescribean experience that exemplifies automation
that is trustworthy. The experience can be real or imaginary.
54. Now describe an experience that exemplifies untrustworthy automation.
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55.
Other surveys have suggested that pilots believe that advanced automation
cockpits, relative to conventional cockpits, have changed the distribution of
workload over the flight mission. By conventional cockpits, we mean ones
which use mechanical gauges, have no flight management computers, etc. (e.g.,
727's, DC-9's). By advanced automation cockpits, we mean ones that have glass,
computers, etc. (A320's, MD-II's, 747.400's).
Tbc pilot's pkysk_ workload in advanced glass cockpits, relative to that in convenlk)aslcockpits,is:
much aboutthe much
Iowa same higher
Prc-fl/ght I 2 3 4 5
Taxi 1 2 3 4 5
Take.off I 2 3 4 5
Climb 1 2 3 4 5
Cruise 1 2 3 4 5
Appra 1 2 3 4 5
Landing 1 2 3 4 5
The pilot's mental workload in advanced glass cockpits, relative to that in conventionalcockpits, is:
much about the much
lower same higher
Pre-flight 1 2 3 4 5
Taxi 1 2 3 4 5
Take-off 1 2 3 4 5
Climb 1 2 3 4 5
Cruise 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
Landing 1 2 3 4 5
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Section 3
Levels of Automation and Amount of Automation
Questions 56-77 concern levels of automation. By itptl ofau_omatgox, we mean the degree to which
autematim participates in performaace of a task or functim, from unassisted human perfommnce, to
shmed perfmmm_ (pilots perform some activities, automation performs some), to totally mamnated
perf_ (the automation pedmms the task, and the pilot is simply infmmed of the operational state of
the automation).
several of these below. For each _pu , v your view or opinion. The
automation and for each circle the number on the 1-5 scale that best reflects
numbers 2, 3 imd 4 on the scales retaesent shared pilot-automation oi_J alien, with increasing involvement
of the automation.
One way to think about the flight is by normal, non-normal and emergency conditions. Please think about
current and ideal levels of automation for each of these categories.
56. NORMAL FLIGHT (all systems are operating normally, the flight proceeds with m unusual
events or circumstances)
The maximum level of automation available for norma/flight on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for Mormal fright is:
unassisted pilot totally autonuued
pe_onna_ performance
I 2 3 4 5
bY. NON-NORMAL FLIGHT (a system failure or abnormal situation exists, but does mot require
diversioa to the nearest airport)
The maximum level of automation available fog non.normal flight on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance perfo_m_
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally. the level of automation I would use for mon-morma/flight is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance performance
1 2 3 4 5
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511. IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCY (the aircraft must be lamled immediately, at the Jteareat suitable
ah-pm-t it pebble)
The maximum level of automatkm available for/a-j_/gM taurgencies on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
perfonnan_ perfommw_
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for in-fliglU emergencies:
unassisted pilot totally automated
pertmnaw_ pertmnanc_
1 2 3 4 5
Another way to think about the flight is by flight phase. Please think about the current and ideal level of
automation for each phase of flight described below.
59. PRE-FLIGHT (all activities until aircraft roll-back)
The maximum level of automation available forpre-flight on the aircraft I fly is:
misted pilot totally automated
petfmmaw_ performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for Iwe-flight is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance performance
1 2 3 4 5
TAXI (roll-back to take-off roll)
The maximum level of automation available for taxi on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
perfommw_ performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for taxi is:
unassisted pilot
performance
1 2 3 4
totally automated
performance
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61. TAKE-OFF (take-off roll to 500 ft. altitude)
The maximum level of auto,nation available for take-o.0"on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
p=f ma 
I 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of auu_afion I would use for _te-o.O" is:
unassisted pilot totally automaled
p orman 
1 2 3 4 5
62. CLIMB (500 ft. altitude to level off at cruise altitude)
The maximum level of automation available for c//s_ on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automaled
pe__ performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for c//mb is:
unassisted pilot totally auu_nmw_i
pedonnan_ perfonn_ce
1 2 3 4 5
63. CRUISE (top of climb to top of descen0
The maximum level of automation available for cruise on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for cru/$¢ is:
unassisted pilot tolally automated
petf_ performance
I 2 3 4 5
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64, DESCENT (top of descent to 500 ft. altitude)
The maximum level of automation available for descent on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance perf 
I 2 3 4 5
Ideally. the level of automation I would use for descem is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
peffonnaw_ performance
1 2 3 4 5
65. LANDING (500 ft. altitude to tara-off' at taxi way)
The maximum level of automation available for/and/rig on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance performance
I 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for landing is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
perfornmr.e performance
1 2 3 4 5
66. TAXI & PARK (turn-off at taxi way to flight crew deplaning)
The maximum level of automation available for taxi andpark on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
perfmnance performance
I 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for taxi andpark is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance performance
I 2 3 4 5
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Another way to think about the flight is by mission function. Please think about the current and ideal level
of automation for each mission function.
67. FLIGHT CONTROL (activities related to controlling the immediate attitude, speed, trajectory,
mad altitude ot the aircraft)
The maximum level of automation available forfl/ght control on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally autonutw_
peffonnan performance
I 2 3 4 5
Ideally,thelevelofautomationIwouldusefor_ightcontrolis:
unassistedpilot totally automated
perf_ performance
I 2 3 4 5
U. NAVIGATION (activities related to planning the flight path d the aircraft in relatiea to ATE
requests, waypoints, destination, etc.)
The maximum level of itat,/gat/otl on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot
performance
totally automated
performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for navigation is:
misted pilot
perf 
totally automated
perfmnawx
I 2 3 4 5
69. COMMUNICATION (activities related to transferring information among the flight crew, ATC,
dispatch, cabin crew, and the FMC)
The maximum level of automation available for communication on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performaw.e performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for communication is:
unassistedpilot totally automated
performance performance
1 2 3 4 5
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70. SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT (activities related to managing on-board automated systems,
including fuel, hydraulics, electrical, engines, as well as computer systems such as the FMC,
autopHo¢)
The maximum level of automation available for systems managememt on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot
perfmnan_
totally automated
performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for systems managemem is:
unassisted pilot
performance
totally automaw.,d
performance
1 2 3 4 5
71. TASK MANAGEMENT (organizing and scheduling tasks to be done during a flight, including
managing required resources)
The maximum level of automation available for task management on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot
performance
totally automated
performance
I 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for task management is:
unassisted pilot
perfonna_
totally automated
performance
1 2 3 4 5
Another way to think about the flight is by human information processing task; taking infonnatkm in,
lXOC_ssin8it, and responding to it. Please think about the current and ideal level of automation for each
information processing task.
72. MONITORING (activities such as scanning, looking, detecting-determining the states and
statas's of the aircraft, systems, etc.)
The maximum level of automation available for mon/tor/ng tasks on the aircraft I fly is:
unassistedp_ot
perf_
totally automated
performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for monitoring tasks is:
unassisted pilot
perf_e
totally automated
performance
1 2 3 4 5
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73. PLANNING (mental activities involving assessing the situation, its consequences, making
decisions, problem solving, etc.)
The maximum level of automation available for p/au/ng tas/u on the aircraft I fly is:
unassistedp_ot
peffmnance
totally automated
performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for p/aan/ng tasks is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
perf_ pe_muaw_
1 2 3 4 5
74. RESPONDING (determining and performing actions that achieve the plans and goals developed
in the planning tasks)
The maximum level of automation for respoad/ng tasks on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot
performance
totally automated
performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for respo_li_g tasks is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance performance
1 2 3 4 5
Another way to think about the flight is by amount of workload invelved. Please think about the current
and ideal level of automation for the different levels of workload described below.
75. HIGH WORKLOAD SITUATIONS (situations in which you are time-stressed and very
busy---not sure if you'll get everything done)
The maximum level of automation available for high workload s/tuat/om on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for high workload situatimts is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
pe_fonnaw.e performance
1 2 3 4 5
74
76. MEDIUM WORKLOAD SITUATIONS (situations in which you are busy but motoverwhelmed)
The maximum level of automation available for medium workload situatiom
on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
peffornmnce performance
1 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for meal/urn workload sttua_ons is:
unassisted pilot totally autonmteA
perfonnaa_ perfonnan_
1 2 3 4 5
77. LOW WORKLOAD SITUATIONS (situations in which there is not much to do--obvions
periods of monotony and inactivity)
The maximum level of automation available for/ow workload situations
on the aircraft I fly is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
perfonnaw_ performance
! 2 3 4 5
Ideally, the level of automation I would use for low workloadsituatlons is:
unassisted pilot totally automated
performance performance
1 2 3 4 5
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Items 78-80 list potential advantages and disadvantages of three differem levels of flight deck automation:
ataamxnotts (Q78), shared (Q79), and unassisted (QS0). Please indicate how you feel about the potential
advantages and disadvantages of each level of automation, as described.
78. Autmmmous operation: automation performs task; pilot may turn on or off, informed of
uuitunction
I believe that automation at this level holds the promise to:
keep me involved
keep me informed
imwove my perfonnan_
improve my situation awareness
alleviate fatigue
reduce woAJoad
wovide more precise data
increase safety
increase airline cost effectiveness
Disagree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
Iam concernedthatautomation at this level could
temperammtal devices
display complexity
losing sight of the raw data
diff_ulty in lmming to operate
data enu'y errors
software engineering etTorS
need for new skills
unforeseen and unintended
negative consequences 1 2 3
workload extremes (high and low) 1 2 3
increase in the number of
alerting signals I 2 3
loss of situation awareness 1 2 3
need to woA amend the automatics
inunusualcircumstances 1 2 3
increasedhead-down time I 2 3
difficulty in recovering from an
automation failure 1 2 3
degradation of pilot skills 1 2 3
difficulty in detecting
system eno_ 1 2 3
relugtance of crew to take over
from automatics 1 2 3
complacency 1 2 3
lead to:
Low High
concern concern
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
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79. Shared Pilot/Automation performance: pilot carries part of out task, may utilize advisory
systems; automation carries out part of task, usually at pilot's discretion
I believe that automation at this level holds the promise to:
Disagree Agree
keep me involved 1 2 3 4 5
keep me informed 1 2 3 4 5
improve my Performance 1 2 3 4 5
improve my situation awmeness 1 2 3 4 5
alleviate fatigue 1 2 3 4 5
reduce workload 1 2 3 4 5
provide mote precise data 1 2 3 4 5
increase safety 1 2 3 4 5
increase airline cost effectiveness 1 2 3 4 5
I am ccxw,en_ that automation at this level could lead to:
Low High
concern
¢OIi_erll
temperamental devices 1 2 3 4 5
display complexity 1 2 3 4 5
losing sight of the raw data 1 2 3 4 5
diffgulty in learning to operate 1 2 3 4 5
data entry errors 1 2 3 4 5
software engineering errors 1 2 3 4 5
need for new skills 1 2 3 4 5
unforeseen and unintended
negative consequences 1 2 3 4 5
workload extremes (high and low) 1 2 3 4 5
increase in the number of
alertingsignals I 2 3 4 5
loss of situation awareness 1 2 3 4 5
need to wock around the automatics
in unusual circumstances 1 2 3 4 5
increased head-down time 1 2 3 4 5
difficulty in recovering from an
automation failure 1 2 3 4 5
degradationof pilotskills 1 2 3 4 5
difficulty in detecting
system errors 1 2 3 4 5
reluctance of crew to take over
from automatics 1 2 3 4 5
complacency 1 2 3 4 5
17
gO. Umuni/_ Pilot performauce: pilot carries out task; unaided decision-mtkiall; ._izes rtw dirt
! believe that automation at this level hotds the promise to:
Disagree
keep me involved l 2
keep me informed l 2
improve my pez-f_ 1 2
imixove my situation awareness 1 2
anev_e fat_ue l 2
reduce weddoad 1 2
provide more precise data 1 2
increase safety 1 2
increa_ airline cost effectiveness 1 2
Agree
3 4 5
3 4 5
3 4 5
3 4 5
3 4 5
3 4 5
3 4 5
3 4 5
3 4 5
I am concerned that automation at this level could lead to:
tempermnental devices
display complexity
losing sight of the raw data
difficulty in learning to operate
dsta entry eerets
software engineering en_rs
need for new skills
unforeseen and unintended
negmive consequences
workload cx_ (high and low)
incrcasc in the number of
alerting signals
loss of situation awareness
need to wm'k mound the automatics
in unusual circumstances
increa_ head-down time
difficulty in recovering from an
mum_on failure
degradation of pilot skills
difficulty in detecting
system errors
reluctance of c:ew to take over
from automatics
complacency
Low High
concerB
conceru
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
I 2 3 4 5
I 2 3 4 5
I 2 3 4 5
I 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
I 2 3 4 5
l 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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llems81--85concerntheamount ofdiffea'enttypesofautomation.By amount ofauto_n, we simply
mean the totalnumber ofautomated systemsor components.
81. AIRCRAFT CONTROL AUTOMATION (automation thatassistsor supplantsa human pilotin
Biding the airplanethrough the maneuvers necessaryforaircraftsafety.)
The amount offlif_ ¢o_m,olautomadon on theaircraftI fly is:
minimal moderate maximal
I 2 3 4 5
The ideal amount offlight control automation inrelationtothat on the aircraft I fly, is:
less automation current level more automation
1 2 3 4 5
82. SYSTEMS CONTROL AUTOMATION (automation that assists or supplants a human pilot in
controlling system modes and configurations, display modes and formats, information, etc.)
The amount of systems control automation on the aircraft I fly is:
minimal moderate maximal
1 2 3 4 5
The ideal amount of systems control automation in relation to that on the aircraft I fly, is
less automation current level more automation
1 2 3 4 5
83. INFORMATION AUTOMATION (automation that informs the pilots about the aircraft and
systemsstates,operations, procedures, regulations, and location of the aircraft and relevant
entities in the environment).
The amount of information automation on the aircraft I fly is:
minimal moderate maximal
I 2 3 4 5
The ideal amount of/nformat/on automat/on in relation to that on the aircraft I fly, is:
less automation currentlevel more automation
1 2 3 4 5
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84. DECISION AUTOMATION (automtion that aids the pilot in selecting alternatives, making
ckok_).
The amount of deckt/oa automattom on the aircraft I fly is:
minimal moderate maximal
I 2 3 4 5
The ideal amount of dec/s/ox amUmatioa relation to that on the aircraft I fly, is :
less autonmtion current level more automation
1 2 3 4 5
85. PROTECTIVE AUTOMATION (automation that physically prevents the pilot from taking
mutate actions and automatically carries out actions required for safety if the pilot fails to act in
• fim_ly manner).
The amount of protective automatiom on the aircraft I fly is:
minimal moderate maximal
1 2 3 4 5
The ideal amount of protective automation in relation to that on the aircraft I fly, is:
less automation current level more automation
1 2 3 4 5
86. I think
aircraft because
is the bestautomated feature on my
87. ! thiak
aircraft because
is the worst automted feature ou my
80f
Section 4
NASA is performing research to support development of a Math 2-3, 6000 mile range, 300 passenger
comme_iai aircraft that is economically viable and environmentally sound. Please answe_ the following
questions specifically related to such a high speed commercial transpo_ _.
It is possible the HSCT will have limited or no forward windows so the cost and weight required to "droop"
the nose as is done in the Concorde can be saved. Instead, visual information may be provided by sensors,
by computeg-based object and terrain data bases validated by GPS positioning, or by both. The inuzge you
see may be graphically enhmce_ to look like an unobstructed, high fidelity, day time view of the outside
forward-looking _ne, possibly augmented with primary flight information.
Assuming itcau be shown that pedormance with a sonscr _ computer data base genemed visual scene is
satisfactot_ and reliable, please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:
88. Most pilots would feel comfortable landing
forward visual scene from:
imaging sensors
computer-based obstacle and
a_x_ databases
a combination of sensor and
computer-based infocmazion
a commercial aircraft that supplied a
disagree agree
I 2 3 4 5
I 2 3 4 5
I 2 3 4 5
89. I would feel comfortable landing
visual scene from:
imaging sensors
computer-based obstacle and
airp_ databases
a combination of sensor and
computer-based infonnation
a commercial aircraft that supplied a forward
disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
I 2 3 4 5
90. I could get used to landing an aircraft that supplied a forward visual scene from:
imaging sensors
computer-based obstacle and
a_pon data bases
a combination of sensor and
computer-based information
disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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91. A forward visual scene generated from sensor and/or computer airport and terrain
data bases, augmented by symboiogy like that found on Heads-Up Displays
(HUD's), will likely be presented on a large field-of-view display. Do yon think
such a display should:
replace the ix_ary
flight display
supplement the primary
flight display
1 2 3 4 5
92. I would be more comfortable if sensors used to detect the runway, surface objects
and aircraft in the terminal area were located:
on the ground ontheaircraft
1 2 3 4 5
93. Given that the HSCT will require continuous automated augmentation of the
pilots' primary control inputs (cables will not be directly linked to control
surfaces), would you prefer your primary control device to be a: (Check one)
center stick __ wheel and column __ side stick
94. Which of these control devices have you flown with? (Check all that apply)
centerstick__ wheelandcolumn_ sidestick
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APPENDIX B
Data Tables for
"Phenomenological Experiences" Results
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Table B1
Orderin8 of Components on Attention to Fligh.t/Automat!on Dimension (a).
Components Rated High in Atten.tion to the l_lsgnt are at me Top; Components
High m Attention to the Automation are at the Bottom.
Q Component Score
3
15 auto
tems
5 [der
16 controls
2
14
1
7
10
auto
auto
AL
4.37
4.32
4.26
4.24
4.23
4.12
4.08
.05
3.97
3.97
3.95
12 3.83
23 auto radio .72
26 3.61
21 3.60
6 ,.55
20 3.40
4 director .25
8 25
9 hz 3.20
3.01
19 2.84
11 auto 2.81
schematics
2.59
24 kRS 2.58
_t.t,_. The rating _has been reversed from the way it appeared in the questionnaire. Here 5 ffi
attention is focused on the flight; lffi attention is focused on the automation
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Table B2
Ordering of Components on Situation Awareness Question (b). Components
Rated High in Contributing to Situation Awareness are at the Top;
Components Low in Situation Awareness are at the Bottom.
Q
21
25
17
6
22
20
18
15
8
9
7
10
19
4
2
13
12
11
23
5
24
1
16
26
14
3
Component
navigation display
sub-syst schematics
FMC-flight planning
primary fit display
inertial refer system
TCAS traffic display
FMC-auto manage
_ound spoiler
autopilot-pitch roll
autopilot-vrt hz paths
autopilot-HDG SPD ALT
autothrottle
FMC LNAV VNAV
flight director
auto engine start
fly-by-wire controls
speed envelope limit
auto landing
auto radio tuning
stability aug systems
ACARS
auto braking
automatic rudder
envelope protection
flap limiting
hydr amplif of inputs
Scor_
4.30
4.27
4.05
4.04
3.94
3.92
3.90
3.88
3.85
3.85
3.84
3.84
3.80
3.76
3.72
3.72
3.69
3.63
3.60
3.57
3.55
3.54
3.54
3.44
3.42
3.40
Note. The rating scale used in the questionnaire was the following: 5 = my understanding of the
big picture is deeper I-- my understanding of the big picture is shallower
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Table B3
Ordering of Components on Obtrusiveness Question (c). Components rated
low in obtrusiveness are at the top; components high in obtrusiveness are at
the bottom.
Q Component Score
22 4.45
15
3
2
13
16
5
21
1
7
10
6
4
23
25
18
14
12
17
8
9
19
26
11
24
20
inertial refer system
_round spoiler
hydr amplif of inputs
auto engine start
fly-by-wire controls
automatic rudder
stability au_ systems
navi$ation display
auto brakin_
autopilot-HDG SPD ALT
autothrottle
primary fit display
flight director
auto radio tunin_
sub-syst schematics
FMC-auto manage
flap limitin_
speed envelope limit
FMC-flisht plannin_
autopilot-pitch roll
autopilot-wt hz paths
FMC LNAV VNAV
envelope protection
auto landin_
ACARS
TCAS traffic display
4.44
4.34
4.32
4.31
4.28
4.23
4.23
4.15
4.12
4.12
4.11
4.1
4.09
4.09
3.92
3.84
3.83
3.82
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.72
3.7
3.44
3.16
Note. The rating scale has been reversed from the way it appeared in the questionnaire. Here 5 =
unob_ive 1= distracting
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Table B4
Ordering of Components ControUing/Wlanaging Dimension (d). Components
Rated High in Controlling are at the Top; Components High in Managing are
at the Bottom.
Q Component Score
3 4.10
15
13
16
5
6
14
25
12
24
26
4
20
22
7
10
21
23
8
9
2
19
18
17
11
hydr amplif of inputs
auto _ound spoiler
fly-by-wire controls
automatic rudder
stability aug systems
primary flight displ
flap limiting
sub-syst schematics
speed envelope limit
ACARS
envelope protection
flight director
TCAS traffic display
inertial refer system
autopilot-HDG SPD AL
auto throttle
navigation display
auto braking
auto radio tuning
autopilot-pitch, roll
autopilot-vrt hz paths
auto engine start
FMC LNAV VNAV
FMC-auto manage
FMC-flight planning
auto landin 8
4.00
3.95
3.92
3.87
3.58
3.58
3.55
3.47
3.46
3.42
3.38
3.38
3.35
3.33
3.33
3.33
3.27
3.02
2.75
2.75
2.67
2.59
2.56
2.25
2.02
Note. The rating scale has been reversed from the way it appeared in the questionnaire. Here 5
= feeling of controlling the flight; I= feeling of managing the automation
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Table B$
Ordering of Components on Predictability Question (e). Components Rated
High in Predictability are at the Top; Components Low in Predictability are at
the Bottom.
Q
21
15
22
3
2
6
13
17
4
7
10
18
11
19
25
8
9
14
Component
navigation display
_round spoiler
inertial refer system
hydr amplifof inputs
auto engine start
primary fit display
fly-by-wire controls
FMC-f|ightplanning
auto braking
flight director
autopilot-HDG SPD ALT
autothrottle
FMC-automanage
auto landing
FMC LNAV VNAV
24
16 automatic rudder
5
12
23
26
20
sub-syst schematics
autopilot-pitch roll
autopilot-vrt hz paths
flap limiting
ACARS
stability aug systems
speed envelope limit
auto radio tuning
envelope protection
TCAS traffic display
Score
4.3
4.2
4.18
4.17
4.14
4.12
4.11
4.11
4.09
4.08
4.02
4.02
3.94
3.91
3.91
3.89
3.88
3.88
3.86
3.86
3.82
3.79
3.74
3.7
3.62
3.2
Note. The rating scale used in the questionnaire was the following: 5 = I can predict the behavlor
of the automation with ease lffi I can predict the behavior of the automation with difficulty
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Table B6
Ordering of Components on Workload Question (f). Components Rated Low
in Workload are at the Top; Components High in Workload are at the Bottom.
Q Component
15
10
22
2
16
21
7
3
23
25
4
5
13
8
9
1
18
17
19
6
12
14
26
11
24
_round spoiler
autothrottle
inertial refer system
auto engine start
automatic rudder
navisation display
autopilot-HDG SPD ALT
hydr amplif of inputs
auto radio tunin_
sub-syst schematics
flisht director
stability au_ systems
fly-by-wire controls
autopilot-pitch roll
autopilot-vrt hz paths
auto brakin_
FMC-auto manage
FMC-flight plannin 8
FMC LNAV VNAV
primary fit display
speed envelope limit
flap limitin8
envelope protection
auto landin_
ACARS
20 TCAS traffic display
Score
4.21
4.14
4.09
4.07
4.06
4.04
3.97
3.96
3.96
3.92
3.9
3.85
3.81
3.8
J
3.8
3.77
3.77
3.73
3.73
3.7
3.62
3.53
3.52
3.51
3.47
3.1
Note. The rating scale has been reversed from the way it appeared in the questionnaire. Here 5 =
low workload 1= high workload
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Table B7
Ordering of Components on Frequency of UseQuestion (g). Components
Rated High in Use are at the Top; Components Low in Use are at the Bottom.
Q
22
15
17
21
6
13
24
5
2O
3
25
2
4
18
23
19
26
16
12
10
8
9
7
1
14
11
Component
inertial refer system
_round spoiler
FMC-flight planning
navigation display
primary at display
fly-by-wire controls
ACARS
stability aug systems
TCAS traffic display
hydr amplif of inputs
sub-syst schematics
auto engine start
flight director
FMC-auto manage
auto radio tuning
FMC LNAV VNAV
envelope protection
automatic rudder
speed envelope limit
autothrottle
autopilot-pitch roll
autopilot-vrt hz paths
autopilot-HDG SPD ALT
auto braking
flaplimiting
auto landing
Score
4.92
4.88
4.83
4.75
4.73
4.69
4.69
4.68
4.67
4.63
4.59
4.58
4.53
4.52
4.46
4.38
4.27
4.26
4.24
4.22
4.16
4.16
4.14
4.13
3.47
2.88
Note. The rating scale used in the questionnaire was the following: 5 = In the flight phase or
mode where use of this component is appropriate, I use it always 1= ..3 use it never
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Table B8
Ordering of Alerts on Attention Getting Question (a). Alerts Rated High in
Attention GeRing are at the Top; Alerts Low in Attention Getting are at the
Bottom.
Q Alert Score
28 4.93
31
3o
27
29
GPWS warning
TCAS resolution advisory
TCAS traffic advisory
master caution and warning
configuration warning
4.93
4.86
4.83
4.82
Note. The rating scale used in the questionnaire was the following: 5 = The alert gets my
attention immediately lffi The alert gets my attention eventually
Table B9
Ordering of Alerts on Trust Question (b). Alerts Rated High in Trust are at the
Top; Alerts Low in Trust are at the Bottom.
Q Alert Score
29 4.53
31
28
27
30
configuration warning
TCAS resolution advisory
GPWS warning
master caution and warning
TCAS traffic advisory
4.37
4.26
4.1
4.09
Note. The rating scale used in the questionnaire was the following: 5 = I trust that the alert
signals a real event always 1= I trust that the alert signals a real event never
Table B10
Ordering of Alerts on Knowing What the Problem is Question (c). Alerts
Rated High in Knowing are at the Top; Alerts Low in Knowing are at the
Bottom.
Q Alert Score
31 3.93
29
3O
28
27
TCAS resolution advisory
configuration warning
TCAS traffic advisory
GPWS warning
master caution and warning
Note. The rating scale used in the questionnaire was the following: 5 =
3.76
3.65
3.59
3.31
know exactly what the
problem is immediately I= I know exactly what the problem is eventually
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Table Bll
Ordering of Alerts on Automaticity of Response Question (d). Alerts Rated
High on Automaticity of Response are at the Top; Alerts Low in Automaticity
are at the Bottom.
Q Alert Score
3.9628
31
29
3o
27
GPWS warning
TCAS resolution advisory
confi_uration warning
TCAS traffic advisory
master caution and warning
3.91
3.56
3.32
2.86
Note. The rating scale used in the questionnaire was the following: 5 = My response to the alert
is automatic I = My response to the alert requires thought
Table B12
Ordering of Alerts on Ease of Returning to Interrupted Tasks Question (e).
Alerts Rated High on Ease of Returning are at the Top; Alerts Low in Ease of
Returning are at the Bottom.
Q Alert Score
3.643O
29
27
31
28
TCAS traffic advisory
confi_aration warning
master caution and warning;
TCAS resolution advisory
GPWS warnin 8
3.63
3.42
3.40
3.39
Note. The rating scale used in the questionnaire was the following: 5 = Returning to interrupted
tasks after the alert is easy 1 = Returning to interrupted tasks after the alert is difficult
Table B13
Ordering of Alerts on Frequency of Alerts Question (f). Alerts Rated High in
Frequency are at the Top; Alerts Low in Frequency are at the Bottom.
Q Alert Score
30 2.94
27
31
28
29
TCAS traffic advisory
master caution and warning
TCAS resolution advisory
GPWS warning
configuration warnin8
2.7
2.11
2
2
Note. The rating scale used in the questionnaire was the following: 5 = On my current aircraft
these alerts occur very often 1= On my current aircraft, these alerts occur never
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APPENDIX C
Discussion and Figures for Miscellaneous Results
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The results of the question concerning how autoflight modes should be
annunciated (Q42) supported the hypothesis that it is more intuitive for pilots to
organize the modes by what is being controlled, that is, speed, vertical path and
lateral path, than by what is controlling (see Figure C1). However, pilots
generally felt that it is easy to predict automatic transitions between different
autoflight modes on their current aircraft (Q43), contradicting the hypothesis that
this is somewhat confusing on current aircraft (see Figure C2).
Pilots felt strongly that synthetic speech should only be used for time-critical
warnings (Q44), despite its potential to reduce visual workload (see Figure C3).
One argument for the pilot's view is that the more synthetic speech is used on the
flight deck, the less effective it will be in conveying response urgency, which is
its primary purpose on current aircraft.
Pilots felt that the amount of information on their aircraft was reasonable (Q45),
as indicated by the large number of neutral responses (see Figure C4). The mean
response was 3.2, indicating a slight opinion that there is too much information
on current aircraft, but the result does not provide strong evidence that there is
an "information overload" problem on today's flight decks.
The responses to the questions addressing the presentation of probabilistic
information by decision aids (Q49 & 50) indicated that pilots agree slightly with
the position that information should not be provided unless it is certain (100%
accurate), although it is clear from Figure C5 that pilots opinions are widely
distributed on this issue. When asked what probability of being correct would be
required before they would accept information from a decision aid, the mean
response was 78%, and as can be seen from Figure C6, the preferred range was
90-99%.
Responses to questions about the high speed civil transport revealed several
interesting findings. Questions 88-90 addressed the issue of synthetic vision.
These questions were designed to assess the effects of two variables: question
wording and type of synthetic data--imaging sensors, computer database, or a
combination. The wording of the three questions varied in obliqueness. In
question 88 subjects were asked to assess how other pilots would feel about
having to fly without a forward window. In question 89 they were asked how
they would feel, and in question 90, how they would feel after a period of
familiarization. The responses were analyzed with an analysis of variance for
two within-subject variables. The results showed a significant main effect both of
question obliqueness, F(2,210)=87.12, p<.0001, and of type of data base,
F(2,210)=59.57, p<.0001. The average responses are shown in Figure C7. It is
clear from the figure that subjects trusted a synthetic vision system based on a
combination of data sources more than one based on a single source. Preferences
for each of the single sources were statistically equivalent (p>.05) on a Tukey
test. Interestingly, pilots expressed more reservations about relying on synthetic
vision when they were asked the question indirectly. Tukey analysis showed an
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increased endorsement with each wording change, as the wording became more
personal and more insistent. The responses changed from the negative end of
the scale for other pilots (2.69) to fairly positive for self with familiarization (3.63)
for the combined data sources. These results suggest that oblique questioning
may be a good way to elidt reservations that pilots might otherwise feel
uncomfortable about expressing.
When asked whether they would like a synthetic vision display which provides a
forward visual scene to replace or supplement the conventional primary flight
display ((291), the overwhelming response was that they would like it to
supplement the primary flight display (mean response = 3.82, where I was
labeled "replace the primary flight display" and 5 was labeled "supplement the
primary flight display." Over two-thirds of the pilots responded with a "4" or "5"
(see Figure C8). Pilots also preferred that the sensors used to detect the runway,
objects, aircraft, etc., for the synthetic vision display be located on the aircraft
rather than on the ground (Q92, Figure C9).
Finally, in response to the type of control device they would prefer for an HSCT
aircraft (Q93), 78 pilots preferred a side stick, 40 preferred a wheel and column,
and 8 preferred a center stick (see Figure C10). This result is especially
interesting given that 98% of the subjects have flown with a wheel and column,
80% with a center stick, and only 42% with a side stick (Q94). It is not surprising
that the A-320 pilots chose the side stick since they fly with one, but the B747-400
pilots preferred it as well (27 preferred the side stick to 15 for the wheel and
column). The MD-11 pilots were the only ones that preferred a wheel and
column (23 respondents) to a side-stick (10 respondents); this result may have
been due to the fact that the MD-11 pilots were older and more resistant to
change.
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60
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40
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Q42
1 2 3 4 5
Figure CI. Autoflight mode annunciation should be organized and displayed by:
what is controlling
(autothrotlle, roll, pitch)
what is being controlled
(speed, lateral loath, vcrt. path)
80
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60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Q43
1 2 3 4 5
Fi_,ure C2. On my current aircraft, automatictransitions between different autoflight
modes are usually:
hard to predict easy to predict
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60
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Figure C3. I think synthetic speech for providing information to the pilot should be:
used only for time-critical
warnings (e.g.. "pull-up,"
"windshear")
used to convey a variety
of messages (e.g., ATC
datalink, FMC, ACARS, etc.)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Q45
1 2 3 4 5
Figure C4. I think the overall amount of information available on my aircraft is:
not enough too much
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1 2 3 4 5
Figure C5. A decision aid should only provide information to the pilot if it is certain
that it is 100% correct.:
disagree agree
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
O-9
Q5O
10- 20- 30- 40- 50- 60- 70- 80- 90- 100
19 29 39 49 59 69 79 89 99
Figure C6. If a decision aid tells me the probability of the choice being correct, I will
accept information that has as low as a % probability of being correct.
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_. A forward visual scene generated from sensor and/or computer airport and
terrain data bases, augmented by symbology like that found on Heads-up
displays (HUD's), will likely be presented on a large field-of-view display.
Do you think such a display should:
replace the primary
flight display supplement theprimary
flight display
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I would be more comfortable if sensors used to detect the runway, surface
objects and aircraft in the terminal area were located:
on the aircraft
on the ground
90
80
70
60
50
40
Q93
30
20
10
0
center stick wheel and side stick
column
_. Given that the HSCT will require continuous automated augmentation
of the pilots' primary control inputs (cables will not be directly
linked to control surfaces), would you prefer your primary control
device to be a:
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